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Abstract
Leaders of international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) must contend
with multiple accountability regimes while balancing responsibilities to stakeholders.
While many accountability mechanisms are donor-led, this study sought to understand
the capacity that NGOs have as agents of change to influence measurement and
evaluations activities. The study focused on NGO applications submitted to a donorgovernment during competitive award announcements for conventional weapons
destruction activities.
Using a parallel convergent mixed methods approach, this study examined the
ways in which NGO leaders develop their organizations’ capacity to implement longterm impact assessments. A direct entry logistic regression of applications showed
evidence of organizational characteristics influencing the inclusion of such assessment
activities in response to a stated donor-government objective. Textual analysis of these
applications helped build a more robust understanding of how the community of practice
proposed to develop and deploy impact assessments.
This study found a field engaged in active conversation about measuring impact
and highlights the changing power dynamics in the traditional donor/NGO relationship.
Opportunities for future research and limitations of the study are discussed. The results
of the investigation have important implications for researchers and practitioners in the
field, including ways NGO leaders can use a collaborative process to demonstrate
accountability, improve strategic planning, develop internal capacity, and substantiate
impact.

vii
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Leading from the Field – International nongovernmental organizations and the
participatory development of long-term impact assessments

Introduction
Leadership is intrinsically linked with accountability; accountability requires
measurement and evaluation. This study examined the ways in which leaders at
nongovernmental and nonprofit organizations develop capacity and implement long-term
impact assessments. With increased calls for accountability, leaders are under significant
pressure to respond to external and internal stakeholders. This presents a tension—and
opportunity—for leaders to manage.
Questions about how organization leaders respond to these challenges start with
governance and structure (Tran, 2019) but continue to stakeholder engagement and
mission focus (Valean, Eynaud, Chatelain-Ponroy & Sponem, 2018). To balance these
stakeholders while simultaneously meeting donor requirements and delivering services,
leaders are called upon not only to improve management but also to diversify such
strategies (Laurett & Ferreira, 2018). Similarly, research in the nonprofit sector and
contemporary dialogues underscore the need for proactive leadership that diversifies
resources and increases capacity (Lee & Shon, 2018; Hung & Hager, 2019).
This study recognizes the inherent struggles in the structure of the donorgovernment/nonprofit organization relationship. As will be discussed, leaders must
address resource dependence within a challenging alliance (Knutsen, 2017). But research
has shown that the tension between donor-governments and nonprofit organizations also
generates creativity and affirms a nonprofit’s identity (Arvidson, 2018). As this study
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will discuss, increased accountability and evaluation are a reality for the nonprofit sector;
however, leaders can show concern for organization identity and mission drift while
simultaneously evaluating and improving services (Atia & Herrold, 2018). The vision,
capacity, and energy to tackle these competing priorities and challenges are critical to
nonprofit longevity—and are critical for leaders to understand as they manage
stakeholders, increase transparency and accountability, and solicit resources to deliver
services. All of these factors and complications are magnified in scale and scope for
international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), many of which work across
borders and can be delivering services in post-conflict or near-conflict spaces.
Post-conflict Weapons Destruction. Landmines, unexploded ordnance, explosive
remnants of war, and stockpiles of conventional weapons pose a challenge to peace and
prosperity around the world. Removing these explosive hazards and improving weapons
security and destruction capacities pave the way for stabilization and development in
transitional and post-conflict spaces. The first concerted, semi-professional work in this
direction started in the late-1980s as a local endeavor of necessity in South Asian
communities impacted by landmines and other explosive hazards. The Conventional
Weapons Destruction (CWD) community of practice has since grown into a highly
standardized and technically proficient global capacity for response and remediation.
The growth and development of the landmine action community of practice largely
emulates the professionalization of the international development assistance sector.
The U.S. Department of State now manages approximately $250 million in annual
funding to support landmine clearance and CWD programs around the world. Working
with foreign governments, international organizations, private companies, and NGOs,
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these projects support the reduction of excess small arms and light weapons and
conventional ammunition, implements physical security and stockpile management
practices at weapons storage sites, and supports humanitarian mine action programs to
remove other explosive hazards. These projects work through a variety of grants,
cooperative agreements, and contracts to international NGOs, public international
organizations, and private firms to carry out the broad portfolio of CWD activities.
CWD programs continue to evolve in response to new challenges. Implementing
partners are adapting interventions to Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan—countries
with active armed conflicts—while also meeting overarching humanitarian missions.
Stabilization and other humanitarian assistance efforts cannot begin until key sites are
cleared of explosive hazards; so, it is critical that work be carried out efficiently and to
key standards of quality. This growth in the responsibility and influence of the NGO
community has been broadly investigated (see Keck & Sikkink, 1998) and has had a
profound impact on the CWD community of practice.
The landmine action community of practice has taken a different path than other
international development interests, at least in part because of its technical nature and
adherence to best practices. The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) address all
aspects of active operations and help ensure that landmine clearance and other activities
in multiple contexts result in land cleared of explosive hazards to an acceptable level of
risk and accepted level of confidence. The IMAS define landmine action as those
activities that seek to reduce the social, economic, and environmental impact of
landmines, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and other explosive hazards. They are of
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interest to our story because they allow donors, operators, communities, and other
stakeholders to have confidence in the clearance activities being conducted.
The IMAS are also of interest because they define “mine action” as being broader
than just clearance: “It is also about people and societies, and how they are affected by
landmine and ERW contamination. The objective of mine action is to reduce the risk
from landmines and ERW to a level where people can live safely” (IMAS Glossary,
2013). In short, the international standards link operational deliverables with
communities’ quality of life and safety. An overarching goal of CWD activities is to
build indigenous capacity, so critiques of governments as donors are diffused by the
reality on the ground for landmine clearance work. That having been said, the IMAS are
the minimum standards of acceptable work for the field. Leaders of donors and NGOs
can and should work together to use data to improve services beyond compliance.
It should be noted here that NGOs, while “nongovernmental,” are part of and an
outcome of a political and economic system that affects the political, regulatory, and
operational environments for these service delivery organizations (Bloodgood, TrembleyBoire, & Prakash, 2014). This is particularly true for the landmine action community,
which saw the negotiations on an international mine ban treaty championed and executed
by NGOs first. It was only after intense pressure from NGOs that governments became
involved in the process that would result in the Ottawa Convention.
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and
Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on Their Destruction (commonly referred to as the
Ottawa Convention) was adopted by sovereign governments in 1997. The convention
grew from the efforts of six NGOs that founded the International Campaign to Ban
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Landmines in 1992. As Keck and Sikkink (1998) demonstrated, networks of
international NGOs and individual leaders can take specific, discrete steps to influence
governments and move international norms. The trend of devolving state action to
implementing partners for international assistance and development—the evolution of
international collective action—was present in the genesis of the major treaties and
frameworks governing conventional weapons destruction activities.
Measuring Progress. As with other donor-governments and stakeholders in the field,
the Department of State has an interest in supporting CWD activities that provide longterm value to communities recovering from conflict. The non-profit sector in the United
States, and the NGO sector globally, are well regarded for their energy, creativity, and
focus on cost-effectiveness (Wolf, 1999). There has been considerable attention to the
adoption and implementation of impact assessments and other evaluation techniques by
NGOs, often as part of overall compliance with reporting requirements (Ebrahim, 2003b).
What has been less considered is the extent to which donor-governments can tap into the
creative energy and cost-consciousness of the nonprofit sector to encourage the
development of impact assessments and evaluation regimes. In this way, donors may
positively incentivize NGO leaders to spur the development and integration of impact
assessments while normalizing these monitoring and evaluation techniques.
Donor-governments often prefer to work through NGOs because they change
faster than local governments (AbouAssi, 2012). While this preference may be
substantiated in practice, an emphasis on rapid response time might harm implementing
partners. If NGOs are expected to change behavior without sufficient notice, fluctuations
in funding can be devastating. As Doornbos (2003) pointed out, donors may change
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priorities quickly while NGO leaders are left to react and decipher or interpret and
implement these changes regardless of their organizations’ abilities, interests, and
capacities. This tug of war between development imperatives and institutional
imperatives has an outsized impact on implementing partners because they may not be
regularly involved in the process of revising donors’ priorities (Edwards, 2008).
While the broader humanitarian assistance community has adopted long-term
impact assessments (LTIAs) as a way of demonstrating effectiveness and efficiency,
there is a question about how best to encourage similar evaluations within the CWD
community of practice. As DePree (2004) wrote on this relationship, “The art of
leadership requires us to think about the leader-as-steward in terms of relationships: of
assets and legacy, of momentum and effectiveness, of civility and values” (p. 6). If
donor-governments are to prioritize the use of long-term assessment measures, they may
have to engage and incentivize NGO leaders to do so.

6

LEADING FROM THE FIELD

7

Problem Statement
In the relationship between donors and NGOs, there are significant documented
incentives for NGO compliance. Even where leaders are sensitive to power dynamics,
the single most important way donors can influence the relationship is the provision of
funding. While the NGO sector is credited with creativity and innovation—especially
with an attention to conserving scarce resources—participatory change is an important
force in the sector (see Hinton, 2004, and Wolf, 1999). Donors have an inherent interest
in ensuring the impact of the interventions they fund (see Roche, 1999). Beyond overall
compliance (Ebrahim, 2003b), NGO leaders may be engaged to develop internal capacity
and strategic direction as part of implementing assessment and evaluation regimes. The
opportunity to do so recognizes the pragmatism of NGO leaders balancing donor intent,
organizational capacity, service quality, and effectiveness (DePree, 2004).
Evaluations establish legitimacy (Ebrahim, 2005). But, as the literature
documents, a problem with accountability mechanisms is the chance they negatively
affect service delivery. The challenge facing NGO leaders is how to respond to donorgovernment requirements for measurement and evaluation practices while building on
internal organizational characteristics such as creativity, energy, and cost-consciousness.
The momentum and effectiveness DePree (2004) recognizes for leaders is related no just
to spotting trends and adapting but also to thinking strategically about coopting donorgovernment references or requirements while building capacity and transforming their
organizations.
Given their intractable position in the realm of foreign affairs, governments are
critical donors in international development and conflict recovery. Donor attitudes
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toward development aid and donors’ beliefs toward poverty and vulnerable populations
suggest a limit toward warm glow giving (see Andreoni, 1990), at least for institutional
donors working within the international development realm (Bachke, Alfnes, & Wik,
2014). Where Andreoni (2007) divided the market into three—private donors, recipient
organizations, and governments—there has been skepticism: “For governments donating
money to [charitable] organizations, it is important to realize that for many good causes,
it can be very difficult to raise money from private donors” (Bachke, Alfnes, & Wik,
2014, p. 482).
The problem of resource mobilization for innovation is especially trenchant for
the conventional weapons destruction community of practice. The work undertaken for
landmine clearance and other weapons security and destruction activities involves
significant capital expenses. Fixed/variable expenses for operations can cost millions of
dollars per year. The competitive announcement process undertaken by the U.S.
Department of State attempts, in part, to hold these costs in check—still, the work is
resource-intensive, so the primacy of institutional or government donors is solidified by
these significant funding requirements. The major cost components for the CWD sector
can quickly dwarf the funding abilities of most private donors and charitable foundations.
As we see in the literature and in practice, governments function in two specific but
intertwined roles in the foreign assistance space: beyond being primary interlocutors for
international diplomacy, they are also the primary funding source for such work.
At issue for leaders in donor-governments and NGOs is managing relationships
while addressing the lack of long-term impact assessments—and a need to continually
articulate value and legitimacy. As the largest bilateral donor to CWD activities, there is
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a clear desire to implement LTIAs that demonstrate value without mandating
requirements that disrupt service. A lack of consensus by way of best practices or
standards from the field is a challenge but also an opportunity—for leaders in NGOs and
donor-governments—to strike a balance and establish a relationship.
Based on this context, the present study asks these essential questions: Do NGOs
develop long-term impact assessments in response to donor prompts? If they do, are
there organizational factors to support the inclusion of LTIAs? And how are
organizations proposing to implement components of LTIAs?

9
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Purpose of the Study
The present study seeks to engage with these ideas of NGO creativity and
frugality because they have not been discussed thoroughly as part of measurement and
evaluation within the CWD community of practice. While leaders’ roles are recognized
in a large body of literature on nonprofit organizations, these studies have not been
applied to CWD activities (see Allen, Smith, & Da Dilva, 2013; Anheier, 2009; Ebrahim,
2003b; Jaskyte, 2008; McCambridge, 2004). Landmine action and CWD activities
include services that are highly technical and structured; therefore, the subject experts
and implementing partners for such service delivery would be best poised to develop
LTIAs that can be integrated into programs with minimal disruption. Donor leaders can
leverage this technical expertise against a desire by implementing partners to secure
additional funding for service delivery.
Every year, the Department of State awards a portion of its assistance via
competitive announcements. NGOs apply on the basis of the terms and conditions of
these competitions. Many of the components of applications are mandatory, and there
are barriers to entry for new organizations; however, some elements of the
announcements are optional or suggested. The full competitive process is addressed and
an example call for proposals has been included as Appendix A.
For the past five years, the Department has included optional language in some of
its notices of funding opportunity that has encouraged applicants to address how they will
develop and incorporate LTIAs during the project’s period of performance. It is through
these elements that grant-seeking organizations can move beyond compliance to develop
and integrate LTIAs. This study will use the applications received to understand the
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ways in which NGO leaders may respond to long-term impact assessment prompts and
distinguish their organizations’ capacities and capabilities. Additionally, it aims to better
understand what commonalities exist when NGO leaders develop LTIA for integration in
their projects.
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Review of the Literature
To establish an appropriate body of literature, this study first reviewed the
frameworks of international foreign assistance. With the exception of some limited
funding from foundations or private donors, the vast majority of funding to support
conventional weapons destruction projects around the world comes from donorgovernments (Landmine Monitor Report, 2016). The dynamics of international foreign
assistance are discussed in a broad and rich body of literature, so this review of literature
focused on theories related to power dynamics and the relationships between and
leadership of donor-governments and the NGO community. The study also included
relevant literature in donor engagement, NGO capacity, and donor-NGO relationships to
provide context for participatory models of evaluation and assessment.
Marshall and Suarez (2013) identified a trend of increased funding opportunities
for NGOs as governments avoided providing bilateral foreign assistance while also
seeking to maintain influence—governments increased their interface with implementing
partners while also devolving services because of concerns related to providing assistance
directly to other governments. The literature has documented these changes in the
international assistance field and their implications for NGO leadership. The literature
review also considered best practices from the field, especially the research on delivering
interventions in transitional or conflict spaces to better understand how measurement and
evaluation regimes can be practically implemented.
Opportunities for Leadership. As outlined by Bryson (2004), the engaged leader
encourages the organization to undertake strategic change, while also discussing the
consequence of failure. However, the engaged organization may not need such
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statements to improve markedly—this is especially true for mission-oriented
organizations like nonprofit or nongovernmental organizations. That having been said,
leaders must “achieve workable unity” (Gardner, 1990). Transformational leadership
(see Bass, 1985) calls for a multifaceted approach in the public sector (Van Wart, 2003).
Behn (2004) terms this “creating the performance framework” to encourage active
leadership from subordinates in pursuit of an organization’s mission or goals.
Leaders within the nonprofit sector can manage a culture that promotes such
positive activity and empowers others (George, 2007; Schein, 1996). Leaders are
responsible for managing the expectations of such exercises (Alaimo, 2008). Linked with
strategic planning or resource development, leaders can deploy internal capacity to
address outside evaluation criteria that is mission-focused and operationalizes
organizational characteristics like creativity and cost-consciousness.
Default factors of leadership, management, strategy, hegemony, and
accountability have the potential to encourage an environment in which large, opaque
donors manage by fiat. Instead, a collaborative process for developing and instituting
accountability mechanisms can build on the history of the CWD community of practice.
Understanding these factors and historical precedents, NGO leaders have the opportunity
to adopt a balanced approach that incorporates accountability measures that satisfy donor
demands while limiting the overall disruptive force of externally imposed evaluation
mechanisms. Leaders can develop clear and documented needs, communicate and
motivate others, and ensure change and innovation are successful (see Gilley, Dixon, &
Gilley, 2008). While these theories have historically focused on the private sector,
transformational and servant leadership have been successful in the public sector as well
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(see Borins, 2002) and for leaders working across groups and constituencies (see Yip,
Wong, & Ernst, 2008).
Research encourages a participatory model for assessment development because it
allows leaders to enable “those out on the margins to represent and defend their interests
more effective, not only within their own immediate contexts but also globally” (Eade,
2007, p. 630). Leaders at all levels and with every stakeholder group can help their
organizations by advocating for equity in a more participatory environment. Studies have
found a positive relationship between rank-and-file (that is to say lacking specialization)
stakeholder engagement and the retention of mission focus in strategic planning
processes (Valeau, Eynaud, Chatelain & Sponem, 2018). The successful development
and deployment of long-term impact assessments would make the most of the access and
expertise of NGO leaders and answer the donor-government’s monitoring and
accountability imperatives.
Government Performance as Donor. Donor-government actions and preferences can
have long-term impacts on the development of states and service sustainability. Batley
and Mcloughlin (2010) examined whether non-state service delivery organizations
threatened the legitimacy of governments. Specifically, they explored the idea that there
is a conflict between the goal of state building (or building effective indigenous capacity)
and the imperative of rapid service provision. The concern about NGOs displacing
nascent government bodies is fair and warrants reviewing operations and guidelines for
those working in fragile environments. In such situations, there are few empirical studies
on operations, firms operate with different norms, and donors are not always transparent
on the operational evaluations of organizations they fund. As Batley and Mcloughlin
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(2010) wrote, service provision by non-state entities is “unregistered, unregulated, and
unnoticed” (p. 133).
A concern with stakeholder engagement and representation as part of service
effectiveness pervades the literature on international development and foreign assistance.
Campbell and Lambright (2016) considered funder and provider motivations for
collecting project-level information by surveying how donors collected and interpreted
program performance data. To frame their discussion, the authors used organizational
effectiveness and multiple constituency theories as grounding perspectives.
Organizational effectiveness theory proposes measuring performance in light of
management and governance (Herman & Renz, 2008); multiple consistency theory
provides a more robust perspective than agency, resource dependence, and institutional
theories because it focuses on learning over outcomes (Ebrahim, 2005 and 2010). These
theories offer an interesting framework: performance metrics can help improve
management activities if they are linked to development, community representation, and
long-term impact. To this end, the authors supported fighting the desire for a single set of
evaluation criteria (Connolly, Conlin, & Deutch, 1980, p. 212).
As Campbell and Lambright (2016) noted, some donors collect performance
information for their own stakeholders. Having multiple stakeholders for performance
measurement underscores the importance of having NGO leaders visualize donor
governments within this broader framework—donors influence the relationship and have
upward and downward accountability (Ebrahim, 2010, p. 102). A collaborative process
may move the relational experience into something more akin to a partnership.
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Besides seeking to gain access and build partnerships with donors, research shows
that NGO leaders must also contend with retaining funding sources or move into
reengagement and reacquisition (Aldrich, 2000; Bell, 1992; Bennett, 2006; Bennett,
2009). The pressures of power dynamics and engagement are particularly heightened
when NGO leaders attempt to reconnect with lapsed or parted donors. In the private
sector, firms are concerned with the most effective and efficient ways to reacquire a
client, and there is access to client behavioral histories and other characteristics that may
closely determine affinity (Feng, 2014). There is obvious interest from NGO leaders in
reacquiring previous donors, given the resources consumed when cultivating new donors.
The literature has isolated two major factors that contribute to donor reengagement:
regret at abandoning the organization and the appeal of a reacquisition (Bennett, 2009).
These factors may be limited in practice, however, as Burt and Popple (1998) and Lee
and Woodliffe (2010) noted—any survey data on (private) donors’ giving patterns and
preferences likely reflect over-reporting on certain information deemed desirable. While
this survey data concerned private individual donors, institutional donors and
governments are historically more inscrutable. It is difficult for NGO leaders to divine
donor intent without establishing a relationship during engagement and acquisition (or
retention and reacquisition); this is not a passive process for successful NGO leaders.
Feek (2007) also leveled critiques against donor-imposed standards and the idea
of best practices, saying these have no place in a scientific study because they are not
replicable, uniform, or true. While this does not invalidate best practices—plenty of
worthwhile activities do not meet such rigorous standards—the argument does highlight a
problem with institutional donors. Best practices are largely context-based or context-
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specific, and they can discourage diversity, experimentation, or adaptation (especially in
a field that focuses on compliance and conformity).
All of these factors coalesce into something of an unflattering portrait of large,
inscrutable government donors. If the process of developing and instituting
accountability mechanisms could be opened to technical experts and implementing
partners active downrange, some of these pressures and imbalances might be alleviated.
Field personnel are active at the nearest point of operations and service delivery. Jung,
Kaufmann, and Harrow (2013) found evidence that foundations, frustrated with donor
governments’ inertia, sometimes banded together to take a more substantial and direct
role in advocating for policy changes. Still, this response to opacity and inertia has
limited benefit for the nonprofit sector, as it does not directly engage with the issue of
improving the ways in which donor governments make policy decisions that affect the
sector.
Inscrutability of Donors. Brown and Troutt (2004) attempted to reconcile these varied
motivations by accounting for the actions and structures that foster a positive relationship
between governments and NGOs. The authors noted that there would be specific
positions to ensure a successful relationship and specific attitudes to adopt. As we have
seen, outsourcing activities to NGOs makes monitoring difficult and can interfere with
planning, coordination, and service delivery. Donor-governments cannot create a
positive working relationship if they “[create] standards but [do] not enforce them or if
funding is not available to ensure that standards are met” (Brown & Troutt, 2004, p. 11).
Such an environment presents the opportunity to adopt creative monitoring regimes that
allow increasingly active grant recipients to work uninterrupted but with sufficient
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oversight. It may also promote NGO creativity and capacity while meeting donor
objectives and fitting into existing intervention designs.
Standards help ensure consistent products—see the International Mine Action
Standards—and are critical when working with transient populations or amidst
uncertainty (Brown & Troutt, 2004). The literature supports an approach, additionally,
where governments provide support beyond money, especially in two areas of emphasis:
structure and attitude. Structural components are duplicable—standards should be
executed on grants or cooperative agreements with clear communication between
stakeholders. Additionally, attitude and environment can affect the adoption of new
standards and regulations by encouraging collaboration (Brown & Troutt, 2004).
There is inherent volatility in the donor/implementer relationship, and government
donors may prioritize political factors over broader development concerns (see Kharas,
2004, p. 4). Yet, as AbouAssi (2012) noted, there is still a clear preference for
nongovernmental organizations in the international development and conflict recovery
spheres because these actors are more responsive and customizable than large
government initiatives. Service delivery has also devolved to these organizations
because, as noted, there is a lack of capacity with some host governments. As discussed
with the development and adoption of the Ottawa Convention, the needs of affected
communities and the service mechanisms of NGOs coalesced long before concerned
parties added the appeal for or sourcing of funds to the agenda. These sector-wide best
practices were baked into the CWD community of practice, so power dynamics are
already inclined toward a more participatory model for monitoring and evaluation.
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Donors have the ability and prerogative to help establish a policy framework not
only to prevent bad behavior but also to promote a stable work environment (Batley &
Mcloughin, 2010). As the authors note, it is especially difficult to review operations and
guidelines while working in fragile environments. There is a lack of empirical case
studies, of information sharing by donors, and of consensus on goals and norms. The
literature also expresses concern about adopting policy frameworks, which establish clear
roles and relationships in stable environments, because they “may be unproductive in
fragile settings where state capacity is weak” (Batley & Mcloughlin, 2010, p. 173). At
the end of the day, the literature conceives of NGOs as strategic actors with significant
agency when engaging and interacting with multilateral institutions, donor governments,
and other stakeholders (Fogarty, 2011). By balancing all of these factors with the type of
work being done and the environments in which it is being done, there is a strong
rationale for a participatory model of impact assessment development and deployment
with NGO and donor-government leaders.
Accountability and NGO Agency. The call for increased accountability and
achievement is the logical outcome of a nonprofit sector that is increasingly embedded in
mainstream political or development processes (Moxham & Boaden, 2007). NGOs
delivering services in lieu of direct government intervention have reported a concomitant
increase in calls for accountability (Lipsky & Smith, 1989). This shift has happened
along with and related to increasing calls for the nonprofit sector to adopt more private
sector tendencies in its operations (Dart, 2004). As previously discussed, outsourcing or
contracting can make monitoring difficult because it is almost always externally imposed
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and can interfere with planning, coordination, and service delivery (Brown & Troutt,
2004).
There is a large body of literature about accountability for international NGOs,
and much of it helps substantiate oversight requirements. These entities have significant
impact in their communities of practice. Cavill and Sohail (2007), working through the
broad corpus, parsed NGO accountability based on its focus within particular contexts.
Practical accountability focuses on effectiveness and efficiency, with how activities are
performed or services are delivered. By comparison, strategic accountability measures
growth as it relates to an organization’s mission. There is a frequent dichotomy drawn
for accountability sector-wide, though Cavill and Sohail (2007) noted an emphasis on
practical accountability during semi-structured interviews following a literature review.
They found this focus caused organizations to overlook strategic accountability and to
miss some gaps in practical accountability as well. Both are important (and both are
worth doing well), the authors contended, because accountability is linked to legitimacy,
response to criticism, quality of practice, professionalization, and visibility. This division
of practical and strategic accountability helps theoretically balance the goals of NGOs to
simultaneously deliver services and justify their existence (Ferguson, 1994).
Many authors make strident cases for transparency and participation when
deploying evaluation mechanisms to prevent what Ebrahim (2005) terms “accountability
myopia.” An emphasis on accountability can hamper efforts to affect lasting change—
Ebrahim (2005) suggests that a strident focus can negatively affect organizational
learning and capacity development. Accountability systems are difficult to navigate, but
a lack of attention to accountability can create blind spots for operations and strategy
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(Carman & Fredericks, 2008). The outcome is to limit capacity before leaders can
develop it.
Likewise, an overemphasis on accountability can prioritize funders before
mission, vision, and theory of change—or emphasize normative impacts over long-term
goals. In a cluster analysis study of organizations, Carman and Fredericks (2010) found
three types of NGO approaches to accountability: those satisfied with their evaluation
capacity, those struggling with evaluation, and those struggling across the board with
little support for evaluation. Organizations most satisfied with their evaluative capacities
and confident in their abilities to meet internal and external stakeholders’ needs were
more likely to view evaluations as an organizational development tool as well as a
compliance measure.
Accountability ultimately means measuring performance (Speckbacher, 2003).
Business models for measuring performance have been adapted to the nonprofit sector,
and some (balanced scorecard, performance prism) explicitly mention nonprofits (see
Moxham & Boaden, 2007 for a thorough review of studies on the applicability of
business processes in the public and nonprofit sectors). Most public sector entities do not
have the latitude of the private sector. Nonprofit and public sector leaders are sometimes
constrained in innovating and implementing change (Liket & Maas, 2015). Additionally,
there are difficulties in transplanting private sector goals and public sector accountability
to the nonprofit sector (Moxham & Boaden, 2007).
For their part, NGO leaders have positioned their organizations as strategic actors
and influence the bureaucracies that fund and oversee them (Fogarty, 2011). There are
also developmental lifecycles to contend with as we explore interactions between donors
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and other stakeholders (Avina, 1993). By bringing donors together with service delivery
organizations, the literature suggests that leaders can capitalize on field expertise while
balancing reporting requirements with practical limitations. Research has demonstrated
that the tension between donor requirements and nonprofit responses can confer a
common identity and spur creativity (Arvidson, 2018). These perspectives of
transforming rote compliance activities help situate NGOs in a dynamic context—one in
which leaders can engage in direct conversation with donors and stakeholders. If we
accept NGOs as agents in their own right, then part of our discussion must contend with
how NGO leaders best promote the outcomes of their work.
Metrics. Stakeholders obviously require results to substantiate effectiveness. The
literature suggests that it is not sufficient to mandate measurement and assessment
regimes—donor-governments and other stakeholders should also specify what to
measure. To assist, best practices emerge that help distill general guidance, past
successes, and the requirements for a community of practice. As they examined the
adoption of performance evaluations by NGOs, Eckerd and Moulton (2011) also tapped
into resource dependence theory (Froelich, 1999; Pfeffer & Salanick, 1978) and
contingency theory (Herman & Renz, 2008). Through these lenses, overlaid with new
and institutional theory (DiMaggio, 2001), the authors observed that organizations tended
to parse evaluation requirements into two levels of accountability mechanisms. At the
organization level, the authors noted evaluations were used to signal legitimacy, as
previously discussed; at the project level, evaluations helped link impact with the
outcomes of service delivery. The danger with lumping these heterogeneous factors,
actors, and objectives together is that evaluations could assume equivalency across the
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nonprofit sector. The potential of improving accountability frameworks is advantageous
at multiple levels.
Likewise, the prospect of ill-suited evaluations prompts a discussion about
improving accountability, from the ground up, with individual or tailored metrics and
rules. Burger (2012) examined oversight options and scenarios to look for ways in which
regulators and government involvement may enhance accountability. Using a case study
of Ugandan nonprofits, the author found that evidence of corruption and perceptions of
ineffectiveness tarnished organization reputations with stakeholders. In this case, there
was not much that could be done to significantly improve these factors—government
regulations suffer from pool design and ineffective resource allocation (and there was not
sufficient political pressure or peer review to overcome these deficiencies). Burger
(2012) did suggest, however, that some regulation and government oversight could
promote an environment for increased accountability.
Even with developmental NGOs that are frequently large and complex
(sometimes reaching the size of host nations’ governments), the nonprofit sector still
contends with operations taking place in self-made or fluid contexts. Burger (2012)
found that monitoring by donors faced less resistance than outright regulation and
oversight in various situations, writing, “Because donors control significant resources,
they have strong influence over the NGO sector and compliance is not expected to be a
problem” (p. 95). While the latter point is debatable, Burger’s case does suggest that
donor involvement has a shorter time horizon and greater project focus than host
government regulations and metrics. This flexible time horizon could be helpful in postconflict or transitional spaces. Further improvement of accountability measures and the
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development of metrics requires us to consider the ways in which accountability can
effectively and constructively be tailored to NGO activities and contexts.
O’Dwyer and Unerman (2010) made the case that effective assistance programs
only function if they include recipients’ perspectives. The same could be extrapolated for
measuring program effectiveness. Access to decision-making processes remains
problematic across the sector; but, incorporating stakeholder feedback can help
substantiate organizations’ missions and persuade donors to adapt. Donor-governments
may not have access to beneficiary perspectives in developing areas and evaluation
mechanisms may not have sufficient downward accountability (O’Dwyer & Unerman,
2010). Bearing this in mind—and understanding that clients and beneficiaries’
experiences are context-specific—making accountability mechanisms and metrics more
participatory might offer multiple benefits.
Discussions of accountability mechanisms must surely grapple with components
or metrics of such regimes. Allio (2012) suggested that strategic and thoughtful
development and deployment of metrics by leaders could ultimately improve the
implementation and delivery of services. For price and value conscious donors, such a
process offers the potential of improving project efficacy (quality of services delivered)
and efficiency (oversight by management). While metrics tend to focus on those
operational efficiency goals, they can be oriented to indicators of strategic achievement,
looking at efficiency and profitability as well as growth (Allio, 2012). The literature of
metrics may not identify specific items or checklists; however, there is clear support for
evaluation regimes offering multiple layers of benefits if deployed thoughtfully and
deliberately in consultation with stakeholders.
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Evaluation Design. Beyond considering the specific components of accountability
measures, this review contends with how leaders can best structure metrics. As
previously discussed, organizations satisfied with evaluation capacities tended to have
regimes that already met the needs of internal and external stakeholders (Carman &
Fredericks, 2010). Evaluation design elements borrowed from traditional, private sector
sources emphasize internal initiatives that build management skills and improve donor
relations when borrowed and adapted to the nonprofit sector (Chalhoub, 2009).
Specific to nongovernmental agencies, Stern, Stame, Mayne, Forss, Davies, and
Befani (2012) undertook a review of impact evaluation practices for programs supported
by the United Kingdom’s Department of International Development (DFID, the corollary
to the United States Agency for International Development). DFID-funded organizations
included three major components for their impact evaluations: questions, designs and
methods, and program attributes. Stern, et. al. (2012) recommended clustering programs
by attributes (duration, delivery method, risk and unpredictability) rather than mission or
context complexity—essentially, the authors recommend that DFID and other
institutional donors cluster project evaluations amidst operations.
As previously discussed, Eckerd and Moulton (2011) warned against lumping
evaluation regimes together because it might encourage false equivalencies—but
thoughtful evaluation design may help guard against this outcome. Sector leaders could
also encourage these thoughtful practices, if only by reminding donors that evaluations in
the third sector require different skillsets (Hall, 2014). These stakeholders and the
different ways they think about knowledge and expertise have an impact on resources and
strategies. Performance measurements and evaluations in the third sector tend to focus
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on how to increase performance (Reed & Morariu, 2010; Benjamin, 2007; Carman, 2007)
and how to improve practice with better data (Hall, 2014). Leaders must think of how to
improve their organizations as well.
Preference for specific evaluation designs may not reflect or account for the
strengths and weaknesses of these evaluation methods. Additionally, biases in theory and
practice might privilege certain skills and abilities without sufficient justification, further
complicating the sector’s attempts to design satisfactory evaluations. Determining how
to design evaluation remains a complicated matter not only because evaluations establish
legitimacy (Ebrahim, 2002 & 2005) but also because of critiques of popular evaluation
methods or systems.
It is worth spending some time considering the ongoing issues with establishing
ideal evaluation procedures and content. Even establishing broad evaluation logics can
be problematic (Hall, 2014). Scientific evaluation methods may foster systematic
observation and attributable outcomes; however, these may ultimately be reductive
(Scott, 1998). Methods that are more bureaucratic may promote rational planning and
sequential evaluation but may result in projects designed for the evaluators only.
Learning models are open to change and creativity, with stakeholder engagement at all
levels (Ebrahim, 2005), but may lack necessary rigor (Hall, 2014). Theory is dividing
nonprofit measurement and evaluation procedures (Ebrahim & Rangan, 2010).
Furthermore, implementation costs can rise if stakeholder interest in providing feedback
is high but funds for evaluation are low. If evaluations are poorly designed, there can be
a disconnect between the scale and scope of implementation and capacity. Finally,
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evaluation knowledge and skillsets may not be properly matched with a privileged or
preferred approach or framework.
The sector emphasizes sound evaluation design not only because poor evaluations
can waste resources but also because there are multiple competing resource requests to
support missions (Heyse, 2013). We also understand that most organizations behave in a
consequential, rational, and appropriate manner (March, 1997). If given the opportunity
to enact organization preference, some literature suggests that nonprofits mostly do so
while promoting the organization’s goal. Despite this broad altruism and responsible
behavior, Heyse (2013) noted that organizations’ unfettered decisions still have external
impacts with their service communities. It is imperative, therefore, that we also
interrogate the nature and procedures for making such choices amidst literature with
dissenting voices here.
International NGOs have shown their own initiative in developing evaluation
practices and procedures (Rugh, 2004). In their overview of such developments in USbased NGOs, Kang, Anderson, and Finnegan (2012) noted a sector-wide movement to
self-starting the implementation of longer-term impact measures. These developments
stand out not only because they extend the time horizon for evaluations but also because
the US-based NGO sector is as varied as the international-based sector. Generally, small
international NGOs in the United States have private donors while larger international
NGOs can compete for institutional and government funding (Kang, et. al., 2012).
Although all international NGOs have encountered pressure to improve evaluations
(Startling, 2003), this broader pressure is finally resulting in long-term impact
assessments (Adelman, et. al., 2007). The U.S. Agency for International Development
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has a history of reporting requirements but has added longer-term goals to overall project
outcomes (Riddell, 1999) and other donor institutions are emphasizing fundamental goals
(Britian, 2008).
Just as the broader international development community has professionalized
and responded to calls for more stringent monitoring and evaluation, the landmine action
community has also developed and refined a series of guidelines and best practices that
govern the sector. Despite being initially proposed in 1996 as a body of sector-specific
protocols and having a first edition adopted in 1997, the International Mine Action
Standards only have one chapter on evaluation and one chapter on monitoring (see IMAS
14.10, Guide for the evaluation of mine action interventions; and IMAS 7.40, Monitoring
of mine action organizations). IMAS 14.10 identifies responsibilities for evaluation with
the United Nations (as a supporter of national mine action centers), the national mine
action authority in an affected country, mine action implementing agencies, and donors.
The standard also encourages broad stakeholder participation (see IMAS 14.10).
Beyond this, however, the standards for the mine action community of practice
offer little in terms of descriptive and prescriptive guidelines. This lack of prescription
for measurement and evaluation is not surprising, given that the historical focus for the
IMAS and the mine action community has been on technical proficiency and clearance
capacity (see Reed & Morariu, 2010; Benjamin, 2007). This lack of focus is important
because it highlights a potential deficiency in the sector-specific literature: an emphasis
on clearance operations without support for measurement and evaluation leaves leaders
without critical data for project planning, service delivery, and capacity development
competencies (Heyse, 2013). Indeed, the IMAS on monitoring mine action organizations
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views costs associated with confidence intervals and other statistical analysis as “better
spent on clearing more land and avoiding accidents caused by long delays to clearing
land” (IMAS 7.40, p. C-3). Monitoring systems are linked to strategic goals and
objectives but only as a means of ensuring compliance and safety. The standards do
underscore the importance of information management to project implementation but
discourages information gathering that might jeopardize operational efficiency.
As we have seen, the emphasis on making evaluations more pervasive and
meaningful has multiple, overlapping stakeholders with varying levels of commitment to
the endeavor (Startling, 2003; Adelman, et. al., 2007). The incorrect assumption with an
increased emphasis on assessments is that organization leaders and managers will see
evaluations as self-evidently meritorious and useful (Carman, 2011). As demonstrated by
the IMAS on monitoring of mine-action organizations, cleared land may not be the sole
output metric but other suggested metrics focus on compliance. Though there has been
some success in making long-term evaluations’ normative and descriptive frameworks
more digestible and user-friendly, there is still goal conflict between principal and agent,
donor and implementer, and NGO and service recipient. There are major differences in
the relevant theories of evaluations, specifically with the motivations for evaluation and
how the information will be used (Allio, 2012; Burger, 2012; Carman & Fredericks,
2010; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2010).
In resource-constrained environments, there is also a benefit in delineating how
certain evaluation functions contribute to sustainability. Carman (2011) encouraged the
adoption of such thinking by leaders as “ritualistic behaviors” (p. 365). Funders can
contribute in this regard by rewarding grantees that proactively or positively use
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evaluation data. Long-term impact assessments developed internally may also avoid the
sui generis attacks on program design because they may avoid the stigma of purposeless
activities that displace core functions of service delivery. There is further benefit, of
course, if leaders can illustrate how assessments contribute in resource-constrained
environments (Hall, 2004).
This kind of participatory design and focus on multiple benefits can address
critiques of externally determined evaluation design. Evaluations can confer legitimacy,
but ratios and other external measures push organizations toward conformity and
comparability—they recognize efficient organizations more than effective projects,
critics complain (Eckerd, 2014). If we recognize that organizations are operating in “a
complex evaluation environment,” (Eckerd, 2014, p. 439), then leaders must be wary of
standards or measures that promote thresholds for acceptable limits of performance or
behavior rather than overall quality. Put another way, these evaluations focus on
operation efficiency over strategic achievement (Allio, 2012). By opting for assessments
that are beneficial on a number of fronts, leaders may further incentivize the process of
their development.
Field Design and Changing Behavior. Given the nature of the conventional weapons
destruction community of practice and the areas in which this work is undertaken, it is
vital also to consider the feasibility of conducting long-term evaluations. There is a large
body of literature on externally imposed evaluations in stable environments but relatively
little about operations in contested or post-conflict zones (see Baum, 2012). Ultimately,
while data collection in conflict areas is difficult (Clark, 2006; Romano, 2006), doing so
provides data that is systematic, reproducible, reliable, and valid (Cohen & Arieli, 2011).
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This study adopts Cohen and Arieli’s (2011) definition of a conflict environment:
“A conflict environment is one in which people, whether individuals or groups, perceive
their needs, goals, or interests to be contradicted by the goals or interests of the other
side...” (p.424). Conventional weapons destruction activities are working at the edges
and amidst these transitional spaces as well as in more stable environments. The
literature suggests that these factors are important to weigh—specifically if donorgovernments require data collection in impacted communities—because individuals or
groups may view government-sanctioned interventions skeptically at best or against local
interests at worst. While most CWD implementing partners require consent from local
communities, returning populations may not have been socialized to the work required
before their return. In this way, the expertise on data collection methods, community
liaison practices, and shifting population demographics resides with the implementing
partners conducting operations within the relevant communities.
If we recognize the ways in which operational environments can influence
assessment activities, we must also recognize the ways such assessment can change
organization behavior. In a study of nonprofits in South Carolina, Zimmerman and
Stevens (2006) examined the interplay between capacity measures such as organization
size, budget, and evaluation activities. Not surprisingly, most of the organizations
indicated that they were required to conduct performance oversight and management by
an outside source. In addition to recognizing that evaluation activities were sometimes
cumbersome, the organizations surveyed had made changes in programming as a result of
the evaluation results. There has been an emphasis on accountability and compliance
across the sector as donor-governments and other entities devolve service delivery.
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Where leaders can take action, both within the recipient organizations and at the donor
level, is to raise the profile of accountability mechanisms and resource them more fully.
As Carman and Fredericks (2008) note, “Given that some nonprofit organizations are still
struggling with the logistical and technical aspects of program evaluation, funders are
uniquely positioned to support nonprofit organizations in ways that help them invest”
(p.67-68).
Additionally, interactions with other organizations may affect monitoring and
evaluation practices. NGOs play a critical role in disseminating management and
accountability practices within civil society circles. Such knowledge transfer practices
may be particularly effective and pervasive in smaller, more technically focused
communities of practice. Marshall and Suarez (2013) surveyed NGOs operating in
Cambodia in an attempt to identify influences in self-regulatory evaluation practices.
The authors noticed an increase in self-regulatory behaviors in the organization, and that
these entities served as carriers of community practices to indigenous organizations.
However, the authors had difficulty pinpointing the influence of monitoring and
evaluation, donor preferences and guidance, and overall professionalization. There may
also reflect interconnectedness or a small pool of donors with similar requirements.
As has been noted, there can be a benefit to leaders outlining positive aspects of
new evaluation and accountability regimes in resource-constrained environments
(Carman, 2011). Where externally imposed evaluations may present a cumbersome
impediment without clear benefits in exchange for modifying operations or
programming, internally developed methods can offer gradations and nuance if
championed by the organization’s leadership (Eckerd, 2014). This study also recognizes
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that performance management mandates for NGOs are coming from multiple sources
(Carnochan, et. al., 2014). Organizational capacity is critical to effective performance
management and data collection, and leaders are responsible for developing and
monitoring this capacity. It can be difficult to know how long and at what distances
organizations manage coordination and decision-making mechanisms (Daniell, et. al.,
2011), so having a more inclusive and participatory development model may help with
field design and behavior change concerns.
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Theory Development
Starting with a grounding in resource dependence theory, accountability,
organizational development, this study reviewed NGO leaders’ evolving relationships
and power dynamics as donor-governments increase an emphasis on accountability.
These theories provide a logical starting point because the international assistance and
development sector consistently manages across multiple accountability mechanisms.
Structural factors influence the relationships between donor-governments, host
governments, implementing partners, recipient populations, and a constellation of other
stakeholders and actors.
The overall study is concerned with whether NGOs in the CWD community of
practice develop long-term impact assessment practices in response to donor prompts and
the ways they attempt to do so. While many accountability mechanisms may be donorled or donor-influenced, this study recognizes the capacity NGOs have as agents of
change to influence measurement and evaluation regimes. This conceptualization of
NGOs as valued contributors is important because it puts the relationship between donorgovernment and NGO front and center. The call for increased accountability and
achievement is not only focused on donor requirements but also on the logical byproduct
of relationships between stakeholders throughout the sector.
This study interrogates the nature and processes for making choices in evaluation
design because these choices influence and impact service delivery. If donorgovernments give NGO leaders the option of developing LTIA components, those same
leaders can then make determinations about how best to incorporate LTIA into service
delivery, adapt strategy to changing donor guidelines, and to develop internal capacities.
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As a subset to the overall research question, this study engages with two additional
questions: if NGOs develop impact assessments, are there organizational factors to
support the inclusion of LTIAs; and, how are CWD organizations proposing to improve
service delivery by implementing these LTIA components. For leaders in the technically
complex conventional weapons destruction field, they must balance the needs of both
accountability and service delivery while proactively engaging stakeholder groups to
manage these forces.
Resource Dependence Theory. There is a long history of research and discussion on
how leaders and organizations respond to the provision of resources, strategically deploy
internal capacity to secure those resources, and adapt to changing conditions related to
external resources. First codified by Pfeffer and Salanick (1978), resource dependence
theory postulates that there is an identifiable series of consequences for organizations
seeking external resources. Resource dependency theory grew from the study of
population ecology, a subsect of biology, which focused attention at the level of
“conspecific individuals” as a way of “delineating units for management action” (see
Wells & Richmond, 1995, p. 462).
Since the initial treatise, which primarily concerned organizational studies and
structure in the private sector, there has been broad discussion of the theory’s application
to the nonprofit sector. The literature suggests that resources are an obvious and
pervasive basis of power between resource-seeking and resource-granting organizations.
This study includes research from this branch of theory because resources are especially
dynamic and require attention from leaders. Resources (primarily funding from donorgovernments) can also give NGO leaders the flexibility to pursue new strategies or
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develop internal capacities. By making strategic choices about the deployment of scarce
resources, NGO leaders make a statement about organizational objectives and values—
setting the overall tenor of operations and helping to realize mission goals.
Resource dependence theory helps parse the dynamics of power in the nonprofit
sector. Unlike the hierarchical relationships and structures of the private sector, the
nonprofit sector includes more engagement and negotiation between stakeholders. While
the relationship between public and nonprofit sectors is hierarchical when resources are
being exchanged, there is evidence of cooperation and coordination. Leaders in both
sectors tend to operate more cooperatively, especially when the sectors conduct advocacy
for policies and develop best practices. As Verbruggen and Millis (2011) noted,
resources inherently limit choices for nongovernmental organizations. Where
governments set standards and provide funding and resources, there is increasing
leverage within the resource dependence framework.
Similarly, in this theoretical framework, Burger and Owens (2013) conducted a
study of large-scale NGOs in Uganda and those organizations’ propensity to survive.
NGOs are particularly important in developing communities because of the lack of
indigenous capacity and resources. Despite the belief that older and larger NGOs would
be more likely to survive, research showed this hypothesis correct but dependent on
short-term funding mechanisms like grants. The survival of an organization was largely
dependent on seeking a grant; the sourcing and use of resources were critical
determinants of organizational structure. Leaders of NGOs should be attuned to such
dynamics, which could cause a change to long-term organization capacity and strategy in
service of short-term resource seeking.
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Batley (2011) observed that organizations with nongovernmental funding made
strategic decisions and exercised greater strategic latitude than service providers with
greater diplomatic tendencies exercise. This dynamic makes sense if we understand that
organizations delivering services in place of governments must also advocate their cases
to ensure continued funding rather than representing a particular donor perspective. Even
if an organization were successful in securing funding over a long period of time, the
organization must continue to mobilize resources. AbouAssi (2014b) postulated that
NGOs struggle with resource dependence from a variety of sources. By examining a
subset of NGOs in Lebanon, the author found evidence that a high resource dependence
on external funding sources might indicate a willingness or tendency to be more
compliant with external requirements. Carman and Fredericks (2008) noted that many
organizations are using data to improve activities—but more than half of the
organizations surveyed also admitted to using this data primarily to solicit additional
money. NGO leaders can capitalize on outside pressures from donors to develop internal
competencies and build capacity.
We see in these studies a tendency toward an NGO/donor-government
bifurcation. Some of the literature characterizes donors as part of a monolithic class—
one that makes decrees to a responsive, flexible pool of NGOs seeking resources. Such
perspectives are unhelpfully simplistic because they miss the depth and breadth of the
relationships between NGOs and donor-governments. Such an interpretation also
suggests an understanding of power dynamics that undersells the leadership of NGOs and
undervalues their strategic planning capacity. Research has shown that tension between
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donor-governments and NGOs has the ability to generate creativity and solidify identity
(Arvidson, 2018).
Leaders at NGOs and donor-governments occupy distinct but convergent spheres
of activity and influence. As donor-governments have devolved responsibility for direct
foreign or international assistance, NGOs have filled the gaps to promote agendas, deliver
services, and manage stakeholders. Conventional weapons destruction projects have
significant startup and fixed/running costs, often involving large capital purchases to
supplement labor, supplies, and other expenses. Of course, NGOs and donorgovernments are concerned with reigning in costs where possible; however, there is
significant leverage for NGOs already operating in the space. They have the technical
expertise, capital assets, and other resources—in short: donor-governments to CWD
projects could not easily replace these capacities.
For those organizations seeking federal funding, a grant is now more akin to a
performance agreement—such as with a contract—thereby making funding to support
measurement and evaluation critical. Carman (2009) found that federal funding was a
significant predictor of organizational compliance with external monitoring requirements.
At the same time, research suggests a new paradigm that represents and recognizes
NGOs’ agency (Bryce, 2006). In many places, third sector entities and NGOs represent
social capital and economic power—effectively serving as semi-independent contractors
for the donor government. Even if these organizations do not articulate power vis à vis
donor and host governments, NGOs have considerable impact and influence on the
communities they serve.
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AbouAssi (2014a) speculated that there is an interplay between factors considered
by resource dependence theory, including revenue, sustainability of funding sources, and
the availability of alternatives. That having been said, the sector is impacted by resource
dependence theory every time an NGO voluntarily accepts donor priorities over
organization mission. As Batley (2011) noted, a formal working relationship can be
followed by informal or trust-based relationships (both positively and negatively). In an
environment with multiple accountability mechanisms, structural factors influence these
relationships—but NGOs can adopt strategies to better manage these connections. This
adoption of strategic responses is particularly key for NGO leaders to understand as they
develop relationship with donor-governments and host-nation stakeholders. Especially in
CWD programs, where NGOs are the front-facing contact with service beneficiaries and
donor-governments may be geographically distant, NGOs are the principal intermediary
for the donor-government.
Power Dynamics. The devolution of services from governments to implementing
partners represents an important change in the balance of power dynamics between
donors and the organizations they fund (Marshall & Suarez, 2013). When considering
the NGO sector in Lebanon, AbouAssi (2014b) found evidence that increased financial
support limited information asymmetry in the relationship between governments and the
implementing organizations they supported. Limited asymmetry in practice may reflect
the reality that governments have an inherent interest in better preparing the agents they
select to carry out services in their name—more transparency levels the balance of power
but also allows the NGOs to better serve as representatives of the donor governments. As
noted, the literature has been interested in these changing dynamics as part of broader
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changes to the relationships between donor-governments, host-nation government,
service providers, and communities.
The literature has offered a defense of at least tangential benefits to this increased
use of data in leveling the power imbalance between donors and implementing partners.
Building on previous research (see Brown & Troutt, 2003), Brown and Troutt (2004)
investigated power dynamics between governments and NGOs and found evidence that
organizational stresses over financing were diminished by a more cooperative
relationship. They write, “The uneven relationship between governments and
organizations, the divergence of government goals and organizational, and, in particular,
government control of organizations through the definition of contract details heavily
influence the existence and level of transaction costs to both recipient organizations and
funders” (Brown & Troutt, 2004, p. 9). A more collegial or reciprocal relationship
between leaders in donor-governments and service providers may help smooth out the
power imbalances that persist—measurement and evaluation mechanisms once seen as
edicts from the donor-government may become a way for the NGO to demonstrate value
and initiate a conversation about overall impact.
In addition to relevant critiques about governments as donors, the literature notes
there are significant structural barriers for organizations seeking to influence donor
preferences or divine funder policy changes. We recognize and must account for the
issue of information asymmetry in such a multi-agent operating environment—not just
between donors and NGOs but also between donors and communities (Burger & Owens,
2013). An inherent goal for international development activities is sustainability, and
information asymmetry threatens the potential for capacity building.
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The change in sector power dynamics is a critical component for NGO leaders to
understand and strategically plan for when soliciting potential donors or delivering
services for existing donor-governments. At the same time, the devolution of services
understandably, for governments, results in an emphasis on accountability and
compliance (see Carman & Fredericks, 2008). It is important to think of ways to improve
the utility of these accountability and compliance mechanisms because they are
increasingly a part of the operational environment for NGOs. Governments are a central
fixture in the realm of foreign affairs—by extension, then, governments have a place in
advocating for international development and conflict recovery (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).
Furthermore, the cost components for CWD activities are significant, running into the
millions of dollars per year. Such funding requirements quickly overwhelm all but the
largest institutional donors. As we have seen in the literature and in the field,
governments serve not only as the primary interlocutors for diplomacy and foreign affairs
but also as primary resources for funding and engagement.
Beyond the clearance of explosive hazards, CWD activities seek to promote
indigenous capacity (see IMAS 14.10) and engender the preconditions for sustainable
management of residual CWD tasks. By supporting long-term impact assessments,
donor-governments can help crystalize the focus of an intervention around the longerterm outcomes from present-day activities in collaboration with implementing partners
and other stakeholders. Organizational effectiveness theory (Herman & Renz, 2008) and
multiple consistency theory (Ebrahim, 2005 and 2010) offer a compelling framework
from which to interrogate the mechanisms and dynamics of power in international
development. Using the aperture of organizational effectiveness theory, Herman and

LEADING FROM THE FIELD

42

Renz (2008) postulated that organizational capacity and management are most
appropriately measured as a development objective rather than compliance with a best
practice. Multiple constituency theory also allows us to view the overlapping or
competing motivations in collecting information on services and measuring growth
(Campbell & Lambright, 2016). From this perspective, leaders of donor-governments
and implementing partners can justify using performance metrics because they can be
linked to development, community representation, and long-term impact. Criticism of
single sets of evaluation criteria (see Connolly, Conlin, & Deutch, 1980) underscore the
opportunity for leaders of donor-governments and NGOs to work collaboratively.
Organizations have subsets, diverse stakeholders, and varied missions (see Balser
& McClusky, 2005; Herman & Renz, 1997 and 2008). As discussed when considering
multiple accountability and cooperation relationships, these informal and formal
relationships support each other (Batley & Mcloughlin, 2010). Donors (and governments
as donors) must do the same or risk serving as a hegemon. As Campbell and Lambright
(2016) note, applying multiple constituency theory to performance measurement
practices allows leaders to access a variety of inputs and perspectives across stakeholder
groups. In their survey, the authors found that outcome data was important to donors, as
were expenditure reports—these data points demonstrated both a provision of services
and reiterated need.
It can be beneficial, as Ebrahim (2010) posited, to visualize donor-governments in
a broader framework with multiple stakeholders and leaders. The upward and downward
accountability of the donor-NGO relationship encourages a collaborative process.
Leaders must also develop internal capacity to properly conduct performance
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management and data collection. It is can be difficult for donor-governments to
understand how NGO leaders manage coordination and decision-making mechanisms, so
a more participatory model may help with field-driven LTIA design (Daniell, et. al.,
2011). As will be discussed further, NGO leaders can encourage a mutually beneficial
partnership on issues like monitoring, evaluation, and impact assessments. The CWD
community of practice itself has historical antecedents in just such a multi-stakeholder
reality. The Ottawa Convention could not have appeared without leaders in advocacy
organizations identifying a need and simultaneously designing service delivery
mechanisms to address it. Donor-governments were a critical component but not the
catalyst—in the case of the Ottawa Convention, somewhat abnormally for international
diplomacy, service providers were in communication with affected communities before
resources had been identified. The strident advocacy of the NGOs involved with the
International Campaign to Ban Landmines birthed the CWD community of practice and
sparked the lobbying for specific resources from governments.
Even without a consensus on how best to enforce accountability, the use of public
funds to support public goals via non-public entities is a primary driver for calls to
measure nonprofit impact. NGO perspectives are disrupted, as has been discussed, by
asymmetric power and information (Eade, 2007). Given that standardized or mandated
reporting often does not match the needs and patterns of an organization, capitalizing on
NGO creativity with optional post-intervention impact assessments may help in the
search for “an approach to solidarity-based partnerships with an infinite variety of
expressions” (Eade, 2007, p. 637). This study investigated these factors at additional
length. Beside the lingering imperative to report for compliance and legitimacy, a
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participatory model further improves the accountability process by increasing the benefits
to implementing partners and donor-governments. If donors adopt a more fluid process,
it could see not only increased accountability but also the development of more effective
metrics as part of that framework.
Donors already provides an existing framework for evaluation (and with it comes
the expectation of assessment) with required quarterly and final reporting on project
deliverables and financial management. LTIAs would be adding an additional layer of
scrutiny—or an additional opportunity for leaders to tell the story of their efforts and
advocate for greater resource provision. Participatory evaluation design, or at least a
measurement and evaluation framework that is less prescriptive and more experimental,
allows implementing partners to provide work in a more cooperative environment. The
question then becomes how to develop the evaluation regime within existing mechanisms
to better develop internal capacity and avoid disrupting ongoing service delivery.
Given the standardized nature of CWD activities, we may expect clustering of
certain evaluation components across the sector. We may also reasonably expect that
optional LTIA elements will be relevant to those organizations conducting similar work
in different contexts. Broader utility is especially important, as optional LTIA prompts
have not been included in all notices of funding opportunity but will be equally beneficial
to implementing partners undertaking CWD activities in other places. Each competitive
announcement contains specific information on the context of CWD activities under
consideration (for example, background on the kind of weapons contamination in a
specific country or the interest in a global problem set). The vast majority of the funding
opportunity announcement remains unchanged from previous announcements (see
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Appendix A) and focuses instead on the technical qualifications (proposal length, eligible
organizations, etc.) for applicants to consider.
Donor-governments providing an optional prompt for LTIAs as part of project
solicitation may activate internal organizational factors related to capacity—prior funding
relationships and dynamics, staff capacity and management—and overall mission factors
(see Figure 1). The LTIAs developed are an outcome of a more participatory model with
optional rather than prescribed monitoring and evaluation activities.

Figure 1
A Model for LTIA Development

Donor-government: optional LTIA
prompt

Organizational Capacity Factors:
Funding and Resource Dependency
Staff Abilities and Management

Organizational Mission Factors:
Focus on Mission, Accountability to
Stakeholders
Creativity

Decision to include LTIAs in Project
Design
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The optional LTIA component in competitive announcements also recognizes that NGO
agency in the international development field—the mechanisms and dynamics of
relationships between donor-governments and NGOs may be imbalanced, but the
ecosystem requires both working together (Herman & Renz, 2008). While NGO leaders
must respond to changes in donor requirements, they can determine how those changes
will be implemented within the organization.
At the same time that NGO leaders are making decisions about pursuing funding
from a donor-government, they may also activate organizational factors related to the
NGO’s mission and relationship to service recipients and other stakeholders. The
inclusion of LTIAs may become another opportunity for NGO leaders to demonstrate
value and tell a story about positive impact. There is a clear interplay between capacity
measures, organizational mission and objectives, and evaluation activities (Zimmerman
& Stevens, 2006). By developing and implementing long-term impact assessments, NGO
leaders can activate positive organizational factors within donor-government monitoring
and evaluation regimes.
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Questions of the Study
Working from this theoretical framework, we understand the dynamic nature and
interrelatedness of assessments, donor requirements, and NGO agency. Theory suggests
a conflicted relationship between donors and NGOs, one in which accountability is
important but stakeholder buy-in is not guaranteed. Besides lacking a clear path for
collaboratively developed long-term impact assessments, there are legitimate critiques of
governments as donors and of measurement and evaluation displacing overall
organizational mission.
Resource dependence theory reminds us that resource-limited organizations will
simultaneously respond to donor prompts but are constrained by their internal capacity.
Such power dynamics related to information, resources, strategy, and priority setting are
central to this study because NGO and donor-government leaders must consistently
balance the needs of accountability and service delivery proactively. These relationships
in the humanitarian assistance field are not always clear—NGOs must advocate for
continued funding while representing a particular donor to a community in need.
The literature underscores this perspective—while various stakeholder groups
encourage or require accountability mechanisms, the focus of most NGOs is on
delivering services to meet overall mission goals. We have seen significant critiques of
government performance as donors, given the power dynamics of working between two
sectors (public and nonprofit) with an imbalance in information and funding. That said,
the literature recognizes that NGOs exercise considerable discretion when functioning as
the primary interface between affected communities in need and the entities providing
resources and strategic guidance. In the humanitarian assistance field in general and the
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CWD community of practice in particular, the devolving of services from governments to
NGOs has led to a more fluid relationship vis a vis accountability.
This devolution of services has increased the need for increased accountability
mechanisms to ensure quality (Marshall & Suarez, 2013). While NGOs may have more
latitude in how measurement and evaluation regimes are deployed, there are still
structural questions about how to select metrics and design evaluations to ensure quality
service delivery. As we have seen, there is a further complication to this process when
selecting appropriate metrics and evaluation designs for field deployment to transitional
and post-conflict spaces (Baum, 2012). Donor-government and NGO leaders must hold
all of these factors in balance while serving and responding to their independent and
mutual stakeholders.
Every year, the Department of State makes part of its operational budget available
to implementing partners under competitive announcements. The announcements have
required and suggested components, in line with federal grant regulations and office
standard operating procedures. The required and suggested components of each
competitive announcement help guide the core and supplementary material submitted by
implementing partners as part of their application packets.
The Department decided in part to make the LTIA component optional because
the International Mine Action Standards are mostly silent on the subject of impact
assessments. Without input from the community of practice, there was concern about
rolling out new measurement and evaluation requirements and the potential disruption to
service delivery. At the same time, there was interest in incentivizing the development of
such measures on an optional basis. Given the energy, creativity, and cost-consciousness
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of the nonprofit sector, donor-governments can anticipate receiving proposals that
implemented LTIA measures that would not disrupt overall CWD project activities
(Miles & Huberman, 1994).
Based on this theoretical framework and the practical limitations of the CWD
sector, this study sought to understand if CWD implementing partners develop
interventions and distinguish themselves in response to donor-prompted changes. As has
been discussed, the nature of LTIAs allows NGOs maximum flexibility to creatively
develop an intervention that will not negatively interfere with service delivery. In this
low-stakes, no-fault environment, NGOs can develop assessment components that
integrate into CWD activities—so assessments can reflect program delivery rather than
drive it. This study will interrogate the development of LTIAs in response to donor
prompts by also seeking to understand what organizational factors may support the
inclusion of LTIAs and how those same organizations propose to improve service
delivery by implementing components of LTIAs.

Mixed Method Design
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NGOs are resource-sensitive both in the need to solicit additional funds and the
desire to conserve scarce resources when implementing accountability mechanisms and
other services. At the same time, it is important for donor-governments to incentivize
their priorities. Doing so not only ensures compliance with stated priorities but also
promotes the broader adoption of long-term impact assessments across multiple
implementing partners and contexts.
The Department has increased the number of opportunities it releases in response
to Presidential and Congressional directives to transparently and openly award foreign
assistance funds. This process obviously represents an important investigation for CWD
practitioners but also a sample of convenience. The selection of this sample is tied to the
overall analysis plan for the study (see Fowler, 2009) and the interest in how NGO
leaders are developing LTIA activities.
Population. The overall population of interest was the applications submitted by
international NGOs and other entities (public international organizations, institutions of
higher education) as they sought grants from the United States Government.
Currently, the Department funds more than 50 organizations conducting CWD
activities in over 60 countries. Additionally, while the Department is the largest bilateral
donor-government, there are other major and minor donor-governments, private
foundations, and other donor stakeholders influencing the service delivery and
measurement practices of implementing partners. The competitive announcements are
made available for bilateral (country-specific) activities or global support for
conventional weapons destruction projects.
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The total population was 315 applications over 43 competitive announcements.
To limit interference of project-level duplication in application materials, I decided to
only use one announcement per country and project type. If there were multiple
competitive announcements in a single country, I did not include applications from
competitions with similar objectives as these might contain duplicate elements. For
example, there were six announcements for landmine clearance in Afghanistan; this study
only reviewed applications received from one of those competitions. This resulted in 117
applications from 25 competitive processes. Four countries (Afghanistan, Cambodia,
Colombia, and Iraq) had multiple competitions with project activities that were
sufficiently different that organizations could not duplicate material (see Table 1).
Mixed Method Investigation. This study assessed the responses of grant-seeking
organizations to determine if they develop long-term impact assessment at the prompt of
a donor-government. Using a convergent design (see Figure 2 below), this study adopted
a parallel mixed methods approach consisting of quantitative and qualitative strands to
better understand the components of long-term impact assessments (Cresswell & Clark,
2011). The convergent parallel design allows strengths and weaknesses of the
quantitative strand to balance and engage with those of the qualitative strand, thereby
building a more fulsome picture of the research question. The quantitative data gathered
during the investigation substantiates the observations from the qualitative assessment;
likewise, the qualitative data provides a better understanding of the interactions observed
in the quantitative section. Quantitative data was collected from the 117 applications
submitted during the 25 competitive processes. Qualitative data was gathered from the
applications that proposed LTIA activities to determine if there was consensus about best
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practices from the field. The information gathered from each strand was then interpreted
separately and together.

Figure 2
Mixed Methods Research Design – The Quantitative and Qualitative Strands

RQ: Do NGOs develop long-term impact assessments in
response to donor prompts?

Quantitative Strand:
If they do, are there organizational factors to support the inclusion of
LTIAs?

1: Does existing
funding in a country
make an
organization more
likely to include
LTIAs?

2: Does staff size
make an
organization more
likely to include
LTIAs?

3: Does total funding
requested make an
organizations more
likely to include
LTIAs?

Qualitative Strand:
How are
organizations
proposing to
implement
components of
LTIAs?

Is there consensus or
best practice being
proposed in
applications to
implement LTIAs in
the field?

This study used a convergent parallel mixed methods design because it addressed
separate but equally important aspects of the intervention (see Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, &
Turner, 2007). For quantitative aspects, the logistic regression elucidated factors that
were influencing particular organizations to compete for grants. For qualitative analysis,
a review of the successful applications helped determine what LTIA components arose
consistently. The combined results from both the quantitative strand and qualitative
strand build internal consistency (Cresswell, 2014) while drawing out commonalities of
service delivery structure, evaluation focus, organization characteristics, and best
practices.
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Quantitative Strand, Theory Development, and Hypotheses
The quantitative strand of this study explored the research question: What
organizational factors support (or associated with) the inclusion of long-term impact
assessment in response to donor-prompted change? Hypothesis development began with
the organizational characteristics that might support the development of LTIAs.
Variables. This study sought to measure previous funding and its relationship to
continued success with specific donor types (in this case, funding from donorgovernments). As discussed in the literature review, the international NGO sector has
seen an increased emphasis on LTIAs or long-horizon objectives (see Britian, 2008, and
Riddell, 1999) but some structural elements may explain why organizations opt to
include LTIA elements in their project proposals. Previous research has examined the
interplay between capacity measures such as organization size and budget with
evaluation activities (Zimmerman & Stevens, 2006).
Previous Funding. Lu (2015) found that previous funding from donorgovernments was a strong determinate of continuing funding—an established relationship
between donor-governments and a particular NGO might engender a preference for
continued funding. Hodge and Piccolo (2005) found that a funding source is a strong
factor in NGO strategy selection and development. Further, previous funding and a
positive response to funder requirements have been found to have a determinate
relationship on NGO actions unless a strategic process is in place (Stone, Bigelow, &
Crittenden, 1999). Gronbjerg (1991) found that strategic decisions depend on stable
funding sources and a desire by nonprofits to lock in funding over the long-term. Prior
funding may also indicate that an organization has the capacity to apply for and manage
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donor-government grant funds. This study collected information on whether the
Department had previously funded the successful CWD organization in-country.
H1: Receiving funding from the donor-government in the previous year will increase the
likelihood that an organization included LTIAs.
Staff Size. In previous studies, organization size has been shown to impact
strategy (see Pope, 2009). Larger full-time staff numbers have been linked to increased
professionalism and rationalism in nonprofit organizations (Hwang & Powell, 2009).
Additionally, Stone, Bigelow, and Crittenden (1999) found that organization size was
negatively related to closure or vulnerability—larger organizations had larger capacity
and could take proactive steps to develop a strategy to withstand external shocks. I based
this continuous variable on project staff counted in each application. Larger staffing
levels might allow project staff to take on roles related to LTIA development and
deployment and is expected to be positively associated with LTIA inclusion.
H2: Larger staff size will increase the likelihood that an organization included LTIAs.
Funding Requested. Each competitive opportunity issued has a ceiling on total
funding available. NGOs may apply for the full amount or a smaller amount. Larger
grants have been found to attract more attention and competition than smaller grants
while also allowing organizations to expand their capacity and develop larger
interventions with more thorough services. McClusky (2002) found that budgets and
staff affected the division of roles and responsibilities—governance structures change
based on the size of an organization’s budget and staffing. Larger grants attract more
attention but may also allow NGOs wider latitude to implement creative solutions, take
risks, pursue strategic objectives, and develop new capacities. Behn, Devries, and Lin
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(2010) linked larger organizational budgets with greater organizational transparency,
which may contribute to more sharing of data on successful service delivery. Research
indicates that increased funding brings additional scrutiny while potentially providing
more resources to staff and implement accountability mechanisms. Additionally, if
organizations are requesting larger amounts of funding they may be more inclined to
address the optional LTIA prompt as a way of satisfying donor-government inclinations.
H3: A larger project budget request will increase the likelihood that an organization
included LTIAs.
Quantitative Sample and Procedures. My sample was drawn from the total population
of 315 applications submitted across 43 competitive announcements between 2014 and
2019. I took applications that had been submitted in announcements that included a
prompt for LTIAs—117 applications from 25 competitions (see Table 2). The inclusion
of the LTIA prompt was left to the discretion of the donor-government team responsible
for administering the grant. The sample included 19 countries and three global project
areas with a majority (54%) including some component of LTIAs (see further discussion
below). Applications from two competitions that received the LTIA prompt had to be
excluded because they were incomplete or had been lost.
This study included applications from the same organization but excluded
multiple applications from the same organization in each competitive process. For
example, if an NGO submitted two applications under one competitive announcement, I
kept only one application for review (this was uncommon; three applications had to be
excluded over two competitive announcements). Given that this study’s attention is on
the field-level deployment of project-specific LTIAs, I did not attempt to control for the
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clearinghouse effect or to make determinations about country-specific issues (security,
financial risk, etc.).
The selection of this sample was tied to the overall analysis plan for the study (see
Fowler, 2009; Peng, Lee, & Ingersoll, 2002) and the interest in how to encourage LTIA
development in a more participatory process.

Table 1
Competitive Announcements and Applications Considered
Announcement
Applications
Applications
including LTIA
Afghanistan Clearance
6
6
Afghanistan Survey
7
7
Angola
5
3
Cambodia Clearance
3
3
Cambodia Survey
1
1
Chad
2
2
Colombia Clearance
13
6
Colombia Survey
11
5
Small Arms Review
4
0
Guatemala
3
0
Honduras
3
0
Iraq Risk Education
6
3
Iraq Monitoring
3
2
Jordan
5
2
Kosovo
2
1
Laos
4
4
Lebanon
3
3
MANPADS
4
4
Niger
2
1
Palau
7
4
Peru
5
0
Quick Reaction Force
5
0
Somalia
3
0
South Sudan
3
2
Ukraine
5
4
Vietnam
2
0
Total applications: 117
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The dependent variable noted whether an applicant responded to the prompt for
long-term impact assessments and included such activities in its proposal (coded 0 for no
and 1 for yes). To make this determination, I conducted a textual analysis of all 117
applications in the sample (Lacy, Watson, Riffe, & Lovejoy, 2015). Using a keyword
search or manually scanning the proposal packets, I noted whether an application
included provisions for LTIAs (coded as 0 for no or 1 for yes). Further textual analysis
would be added to the qualitative analysis, discussed in later sections.
The first independent variable was previous funding. I based this bivariate
indicator on providing a grant to the organization within one year of the award
recommendation (coded 0 for no and 1 for yes). The independent variable of
organization size was a continuous variable based on the project staff size denoted in
each application gathered either from budgets, proposal texts, or organograms. The
independent continuous variable of grant size was based on the level of funding requested
in each application. The descriptive statistics for the average of the independent and
dependent variables is given in Table 2.
Slightly more than half (54%, n=63) of the sample included some component of
long-term impact assessment methodologies and half did not (46%, n=54). Fewer than
half (44%, n=51) had previously received funding from the donor-government within the
previous calendar year; the majority (56%, n=66) of projects had not received funding
from the donor-government in the previous year. The mean proposed project team size
was almost 46, though the median staff size of 25 indicates smaller teams. The smallest
proposed team size of one individual and the largest 230 staff members. The smallest
amount of funding requested under the competitive announcements was $120,175 and the
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largest was $4,000,000. The mean funding level of $924,955 and median of $819,500
suggests that projects tended to have smaller budgets requests.

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Mean

Median

Range Min.

Range Max.

DV: LTIA inclusion

0.54

-

-

-

IV: Previous funding

0.44

-

-

-

IV: Staff size

45.85

25

1

230

$924,955

$819,500

$120,175

$4,000,000

IV: Funding requested
n=117

Quantitative Results. To test the relationship between the dependent variable of
response to the LTIA prompt and the independent variables, I conducted a direct logistic
regression using the categorical (previous funding) and continuous (staff size and funding
requested) independent variables with the categorical dependent variable (LTIA
included).
The direct logistic regression model selected all 117 cases; no data was missing
from the applications selected based on the previously described criteria. The SPSS
classification report for the baseline model, before inputting explanatory variables, had an
overall predictive value of 53.8 percent correct (representing a near-random
classification; see Field, 2004). See Table 3 for an overview of the baseline model.
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Table 3
Initial Model

Constant

B

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

0.154

0.185

.691

0.2480

.406

1.167

-2LL
Original
161.503

Note. n=117
The initial model indicated a lack of statistical significance (p=0.406) and a
coefficient of the constant (i.e., the intercept) of 0.154 in the model (see Tabachnick &
Fidell, 2006). The lack of statistical significance in the baseline indicates that the
coefficient for one or more of the independent variables will increase the model’s
predictive power.
SPSS then ran the direct logistic regression model with the three independent
variables. The assessment of fit, based on the results in Table 4, indicate a moderate fit
of R2=0.78 (the initial -2 Log likelihood of 161.503 divided by the model -2 Log
likelihood of 126.025). Logistic regression models input to SPSS can produce a number
of pseudo R-squared statistics. Cox & Snell’s R2 coefficient, which accounts for sample
size, is 0.262. Field (2004) noted that the Cox & Snell R2 coefficient of determination for
the logistic regression model never reaches the maximum value of 1 and recommends a
number of other statistics. The regression model indicated a Nagelkerke R2 coefficient of
0.349, which indicates that the variables are exerting a limited amount of influence on the
outcome of the model. The Hosmer & Lemeshow Test is not statistically significant,
which is desired (Field, 2004). The regression also produced a Chi-square probability
distribution statistic of 35.478 (df=3, p<.001), which suggests that the model is not over-
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dispersed (see Field, 2004). The regression shows a moderate positive relationship in the
model.

Table 4
Logistic Regression – Assessment of Fit

Step 1

-2LL
Model
126.025

Cox &
Snell R2
0.262

Nagelkerke
R2
0.349

Hosmer & Lemeshow Test
Chi-square df
Sig.
5.942
8
0.654

Note. n=117
Based on the results of the logistic regression (see Table 5), the study did not find
sufficient evidence that the independent variable for previous funding is a predictive
factor on whether an organization included LTIAs in its proposal (H1). The model did
find support for the hypotheses that suggest a relationship between the inclusion of
LTIAs and the proposed staff size (H2) and requested funding level (H3). Both of these
variables indicate a positive relationship in the model and were statistically significantly
different from zero (see Table 5). The coefficient for proposed staff size (H2:
Exp(B)=1.017) and for funding requested (H3: Exp(B)=1.000) indicate a positive
interaction between the dependent variables and the independent variable of LTIA
inclusion. A larger funding request level and larger staff size were found to be positively
related to the probability for LTIA inclusion, and the overall model is statistically
significantly different from zero. Each additional staff member requested in the proposal
increased the odds ratio of receiving funding by two percent, which may be related to a
wide range of staff sizes proposed. With a Beta coefficient of 0.000001 (or a 0.0001%
increase in the likelihood of funding for each additional dollar requested), every $10,000
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in additional funding requested increased the likelihood of funding by one percent. This
variable also had a wide range of values, as funding requested had a minimum value of
$120,175 and $4,000,000. The impact of these relationships on leaders’ decision making
and prioritization process will be taken up following discussion of the qualitative results.

Table 5
Proposals Include LTIAs and Prior Funding, Staff Size, Requested Funding
B

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

95% C.I. for Exp(B)

Prev. Funding
(1=yes)
Staff Size

0.502

0.481

1.091

1

0.296

1.653

0.644

4.243

0.017

0.008

4.325

1

0.038*

1.017

1.001

1.033

Funding Req.

0.000†

0.000††

5.671

1

0.017*

1.000

1.000

1.000

Constant

-2.009

0.681

10.85
1
0.001*
3
Note. n=117, *p<.05; † = 0.000001; †† = 6.1226E-7

0.134

Included
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Qualitative Strand and Data Integration
To augment the quantitative analysis, this study also aimed to refine what is
known about the CWD sector in particular and donor-NGO relationships more generally
by exploring the potential similarities between applications submitted under competitive
announcements and their LTIA activities. The essential research question of the
qualitative strand was: Is there consensus or best practice being proposed in applications
to implement LTIAs in the field?
To this end, the study used qualitative analysis to determine what, if any,
emergent themes or practices were being proposed in responses to the LTIA prompt.
Any emergent themes or practices would help supplement the quantitative results and
provide further understanding of the field’s approach to impact assessment through a
more participatory model. Qualitative results also help build a better picture of how
NGO leaders can manage coordination and decision-making mechanisms in a more
participatory model (Daniell, et. al., 2011). The qualitative research strand was designed
to elucidate areas of consensus from the field that might inform best practice and improve
service delivery. In the absence of formal guidance on how best to deploy long-term
impact assessment measures, the implementing partners could (theoretically) lead on the
initiative and propose mechanisms that best met donor intent while engaging NGO
creativity and capacity.
Qualitative Sample and Procedures. To conduct the qualitative analysis, I reviewed
the 117 applications that had been submitted under a competitive process between 2015
and 2019 that included the LTIA prompt. Having conducted textual analysis for the
quantitative strand to determine whether an application contained LTIA elements, I
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returned to the applications that had proposed LTIA measures. That resulted in 63
applications (54% of the sample of 117).
Data from the 63 applications was collected by not immediately categorized.
While quick categorization helps with researcher recall (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), there is
not broad consensus within the mine action community of practice to guide such data
coding. Instead, I conducted a word search based on the literature review to determine
relevant responses (Lacy, Watson, Riffe, & Lovejoy, 2015). I recorded this material with
the application data. I reviewed each of the full proposals (both funded and unfunded)
not only for LTIA methodology but also for any measurement or evaluation procedures
based on common terminology discussed in the literature review. The review of both
funded and unfunded proposals was intentional—the qualitative analysis would benefit
from a fuller understanding of the components developed by operators even if the
proposal had not been successful.
The keyword search was primarily conducted by electronic search functions
(some existed only in paper format and had to be manually scanned) for words related to
impact assessment throughout the entire application. This included “impact,”
“measurement,” “outcome,” “evaluation,” “quality,” “assurance,” “assessment,” and
“control.” Terms selected for the keyword search came from the operational language of
the two International Mine Action Standards on monitoring and evaluation. As
previously noted, the IMAS are primarily concerned with compliance, safety, and
conformity; however, despite not reflecting the best practices in monitoring and
evaluations, the IMAS represent the minimum requirement for operations undertaken by
the CWD community of practice. These words reflect a broad range of activities related
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to impact assessment in the research literature as well but seen through the lens of the
field protocols and international standards.
I reviewed the entire application to determine what measurement and assessment
activities might be included because the donor-government has standard terms and
conditions for all of its grants that include short-term monitoring and performance data.
Beyond the requirement for quarterly programmatic and financial reporting (including
performance indicators for specific project outputs and objectives), the donor-government
requires implementing partners to complete quarterly metrics tables that track
quantitative progress over the grant’s lifecycle. Implementing partners must also submit
a final report covering the same information at the end of a grant’s period of
performance. Given that these short-term monitoring activities are required, I anticipated
compliance; a more thorough search of the entire application allowed me to conduct
qualitative information analysis to determine if components were related to the research
question or standard reporting (see Patton, 1980; Taylor, Bogdan, & DeVault, 2015).
In conducting the search and recording responses, I used thick descriptives to
more fully illustrate the study’s findings and potentially influence policy guidance in the
future. Research has suggested that emergent themes or practices would help verify the
quantitative results and provide further understanding of the field’s approach to impact
assessment. This thorough reading provided information not only on whether
organizations were proposing potential LTIA measures but might be using a different
nomenclature than the one adopted by the donor-government.
Data Analysis. After conducting the keyword search, I transcribed responses related to
long-term impact assessment into a spreadsheet. Without an a priori assumption about
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the nature and techniques for long-term impact assessment activities within the
community of practice, I relied on a review of the responses to assess emergent attributes
(Taylor, Bogdan, & DeVault, 2015). I reviewed each application packet—technical
proposal, budget and budget narrative, and any supplemental/annex material—that was
provided by the grant-seeking organization.
Having looked for the words that related to the theme of inquiry, I looked for
grouping around themes or practices (Terrell, 2012). In most cases, responses clustered
into five dominant codes or areas that are important characteristics or practices for longterm impact assessment. These included:
1. Structure—specific mechanisms or deliverables
a. Identifiers: Internal or external components to gather impact data, such as
surveys or assessments; a process by which implementing partners will
solicit input or gauge progress; data collection and information
management
2. Information sources—specific data sources
a. Identifiers: References to specific or general sources of information to
build into the impact assessment structure described above; identifying
beneficiaries (direct or indirect); disaggregating information as evidence
of an understanding of impact
3. Tools/Implementation—how to carry out data collection
a. Identifiers: General or sector-specific tools and techniques to support data
collection; technologies to support data collection and analysis; listing
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equipment needed (either in proposals or in budgets) to support
information management
4. Time horizon—events or a schedule for assessment
a. Identifiers: Timelines for impact assessment or monitoring/evaluation
activities; program deadlines or project milestones for data collection;
events or timelines unrelated to required reporting (quarterly and final
project reporting as discussed)
5. Information dissemination—mechanisms to share results
a. Identifiers: Intention to analyze and synthesize data collected above;
discussions of impact data improving learning, planning, training, or
service delivery; linking impact assessment activities with strategic goals
and objectives
Of the applications that did include LTIA elements (those above and beyond standard
reporting requirement), all contained multiple elements of the five long-term assessment
methodology components: structure, information sources, tools/implementation, time
horizon and information dissemination. These categories are described in greater detail
below; the frequencies for specific response elements are included in Table 6.
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Table 6
Frequency of Specific LTIA Components in Applications
Structure

Information
Sources

Tools

Time Horizon

Information
Dissemination

Included

63

50

31

16

12

Not Included

0

13

32

47

51

% Included

100%

79%

49%

25%

19%

Note. n=63

The first two areas of analysis—structure and information sources—are part of
broader discussions about how best to collect data on project delivery, performance, and
impact for all nonprofits. It is important to note here that, of the applications that
included LTIAs, all of them included multiple qualitative components to facilitate the
LTIA collection process. Only a few responses fell outside of these categories and
tended to include assessment activities or follow-on benefits that were vague in
description or relevance. For example, three applications suggested tying impact
assessment to sustainability but did not indicate the scope of sustainability or how impact
data would be used to measure and evaluate it. The inclusion of multiple qualitative
components suggests a field that is actively engaged in developing foundational LTIA
elements while developing a working understanding of how best to do so. NGO leaders
can channel this creativity into a more participatory model of assessment development
and co-opt the process to build internal capacity and plan strategically.
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Structure. Many of the applications that included LTIA elements included
specific assessment deliverables or frameworks. I clustered these responses under the
category of structure because they provided a concrete way of arranging or constructing a
systematic data-collection process—they told how the organization would conduct longterm impact assessments. This was the most broadly represented category; every
application included some discussion of LTIA structure. Examples of structure included
comparing data internally across project components, collecting qualitative and
quantitative data from beneficiaries, or using data to actively plan for future operations or
interventions. One application wrote, “Post-clearance surveys will identify the
socioeconomic outcomes of the clearance in terms of the amount of land in use, the type
of land use, the financial benefit for the beneficiaries in terms of annual income received
and the investment enabled by clearance.” While not all responses were similarly
detailed, all applicants that included LTIAs noted some kind of process or structure to
implement the LTIA.
For this category, I noted both internal and external structural factors driving
LTIA implementation. While the LTIA prompt focuses attention on an external structure
from the donor-government, several of the responses highlighted internal process changes
to make better use of the data collected. Several applications indicated that assessment
information would be used to improve internal training. Beyond measuring “a real
increase in the quality of life for the people in the communities selected for the project,”
as one applicant wrote, LTIAs could also support improvement to technical standards and
internal processes.
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Information sources. I reviewed the applications to see if any had identified
specific (or unique) information sources. I considered responses related to this category
if they identified where to gather impact data. This was the second most broadly
represented category, with 79 percent of applications identifying a specific source for
LTIA data collection. Most included references to community groups, direct
beneficiaries, local leaders, national authorities, or other sources of information. I also
considered the collection of information disaggregated by gender, age, occupation, or
other factor as a distinct component of information management—anything to capture
additional nuance in responses might indicate a deeper understanding of an intervention’s
impact and provide benefit to a number of reporting mechanisms.
Information sources are important to identify before an intervention to determine
if the appropriate level of information will be gathered from sources with sufficient
experience with the intervention. Further, as Ebrahim (2003b) has written, accountability
structures between NGOs and beneficiaries are inherently relational. Details in this
category were not as fulsome as with structure. Nearly all of the applicants indicated that
the “beneficiary community” would be the source of information. One application did
note that the project goal of improving livelihoods was linked to “reducing poverty and
reducing socio-economic marginalization, inequalities and exclusion of vulnerable
groups.” This potentially could identify subsets of communities (vulnerability as a
determining factor) and encourage engagement with these specific, often excluded
beneficiaries.
Tools/Implementation. Given the technical nature of the work being conducted
under most CWD projects, this study was concerned with any field-level activities or
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techniques that might improve impact assessment procedures. Responses recorded in this
category answered the essential question of how implementing partners would gather
LTIA data. Slightly less than half (49 percent) of respondents included specific tools.
The CWD community of practice has already adopted a number of thorough
information management systems (see IMAS 05.10: Information Management for Mine
Action) and technologies to improve the capturing, retention, and use of data in the field.
To date, the focus of these systems and technologies has been on the collection and
retention of project outputs rather than impacts.
The historic focus technical competencies in CWD projects—and a need to put
safety and quality of operations before impact assessments—makes the use of existing
tools or implementation mechanisms of particular interest. Several applications proposed
to develop capacity by training specific staff on impact assessment; to use key staff as
embedded personnel during operations or to develop key assessment practices; or,
working with local leaders to develop questionnaires. One applicant proposed to conduct
impact assessment “through short interviews at community and user level and output
reported through ‘evaluation tables.’” Another applicant proposed using its current
information management system to collect additional impact assessment data. By
identifying specific tools, applicants detail necessary capacities for leaders to provide.
The use of specific assessment teams to work directly with communities and
service beneficiaries would remove measurement requirements from field/operational
staff conducting technically challenging and safety-related responsibilities. This would
require an increase in funding or the lengthening of project time but would increase the
profile of data collection. It would also professionalize LTIA activities.
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Eighteen of the applications (a majority of those that included tools) made
specific reference to using core staff (meaning operational leaders and management) to
carry out assessment activities—possibly indicating the high level of attention LTIAs
would receive from the country team. While the other applicants did not mention using
staff members, it is important to note that none of the applications proposed outsourcing
impact assessment. Insofar as organization leaders are pursuing a strategy of LTIA
development, they are planning to use internal capacities to do so.
Time horizon. I assessed organizations’ use of time horizons or major project
events for data collection. These activities or time points needed to be separate and
discrete from the standard reporting requirements (quarterly and final programmatic and
financial reports) described in previous chapters and in the competitive announcement
itself (Appendix A). As noted in Table 6 above, fewer applications included a specific
time for LTIA data collection (only 25 percent of the applications that included LTIA
elements stated a period in which to gather information). All of the applications that
included a time horizon used six months as a reference period. A few applications
included major events like land handover ceremonies or other specific post-project events
that would tie overall project milestones to impact assessment activities but might fall
within the normal period of operations. These are important to note because they
represent concrete opportunities to gather information and are built into the overall
project delivery even if they do not meet more rigorous measurement and evaluation
practices. Major events or project milestones have a forcing function of directing
attention to phases of project completion that may occur at multiple times—raising the
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profile of impact assessment with stakeholders and underscoring its importance with
staff.
The lack of responses here may indicate a level of uncertainty from the operators.
Although descriptions of LTIAs frequently tied assessments to “sustainability” or socioeconomic improvements, very few of the applications gave any concrete time horizon (612 months). The lack of specific time horizons in a majority of the applications may also
indicate a lack of consensus on when to incorporate assessment activities into project
delivery. All of the applications that listed a specific post-project time to conduct impact
assessments were for competitive announcements with higher budget thresholds. In these
instances, requested budgets ranged from $500,000 to $2,600,000 (most were above the
mean funding level of $924,955 and median of $819,500 for all applications that included
LTIA elements).
Information dissemination. Finally, I reviewed the proposals’ integration of
monitoring and evaluation—a hybrid of basic assessment measures and sector-specific
activities that bridged the four previous clustered LTIA components. In 12 of the 63
proposals reviewed, applicants included a multifaceted activity that recognized the
importance of impact assessment, transformed the data collected, or spoke to a specific
investment in capacity to support collaboration and transparency with internal and
external stakeholders. These activities not only indicated some kind of information
management but also feedback loops or continuous improvement processes (Ebrahim,
2003a).
Applications noted that LTIA deliverables could improve future proposals and
reporting. Applications also indicated that assessment activities could give operators the
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chance to talk about the donor with beneficiary communities. Although this is obviously
of more interest to the donor than the beneficiaries, it does move assessment beyond
compliance and into a position of stakeholder engagement. One application also noted
that the overarching mission of improving livelihoods needed to be linked to reducing
poverty, which would require broader metrics and assessments than land cleared (see
IMAS 7.40, Monitoring of mine action organizations). In these instances, proposals
identified a greater use for data than compliance and presupposed NGO command of a
valuable resource. Some of the applications that included elements of information
dissemination also centered control of data with the NGO and not the donor—one of the
applications compared the processed of information dissemination with storytelling.
By proposing more complex components that assumed a framework for data
collection and assumed the importance of impact assessments, these organizations were
attempting to integrate capacity development and service delivery. Information
dissemination suggests that there is value in gathering and synthesizing data for use with
internal and external stakeholders. As Ebrahim (2003b) has noted, continuous learning
and feedback loops are preferable to other types of evaluation; by incorporating LTIA
into the structure of project implementation, organization leaders can build capacity and
satisfy donor-government requirements.
Integration of Data. The quantitative results sought to understand what organizational
factors supported the inclusion of long-term impact assessment activities in response to
donor-prompted change. Two of the independent variables made statistically significant
impacts in the model. In the case of the independent variable for receiving previous
funding, there was not a statistically significant relationship between an organization’s
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inclusion of LTIA activities and the receipt of funding from the donor government in the
country of operations within the previous calendar year. While past funding is often
associated with continued support, the deployment of LTIAs may not have been
emphasized in the past or previous funding decisions in a particular country did not
account for these factors as heavily.
There was support, however, for the inclusion of the two remaining independent
variables (staff size and funding requested). Both were statistically significant with a
positive relationship between including LTIAs and increased staff and project budget.
The predictive power of these relationships, when calibrated against the units of measure
(change per $10,000 requested or additional staff member proposed), resonates with the
findings of the qualitative strand and overall needs for capacity development.
Not only did a majority of applicants include some indication of LTIA practices
in their project proposals, but the qualitative analysis also showed responses beyond the
standard, required program and financial reporting. These activities clustered into to two
major groups (a normative framework and sector-specific components) that broke down
further into five areas of interest: structure, information sources, tools/implementation,
time horizon, and information dissemination (a hybrid of framework and sector
operations).
The quantitative and qualitative strands augmented our understanding of the
proposed LTIA practices from the study sample. Organizations that received a donorgovernment prompt on LTIAs were more likely than not to respond with some level of
granularity on how to do so. Perhaps most important to the study, of all the applications
that included LTIA activities, all included multiple components to enhance overall LTIA
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activities. Further, all of the applications that included LTIAs proposed some structure
by which to gather the necessary information. This commonality in the community of
practice suggests a growing consensus on or understanding of the importance (or
importance to the donor-government) of LTIAs in project delivery and a willingness to
develop LTIA elements.
The relationships between funding requested and staff size and the information
sources and tools suggest that organizations are preparing to bear the responsibility for
LTIAs internally. None of the applications proposed outsourcing impact assessments;
indeed, there were proposals to train specialized staff to conduct these tasks in some
organizations. Any efforts to develop internal capacities for LTIAs will require
resources—either in funding or in staffing—and require leaders to plan strategically to
maximize the benefits of these added responsibilities.
When budgets included line items for impact assessment, it was always for staff
travel to beneficiary communities (with some limited training budgeted in some
instances). This suggests that organizations are planning and budgeting to subsume
LTIA requirements rather than create new project elements. The open-ended prompt did
lead to some uncertainty with regard to the time required to conduct LTIAs. The larger
than average funding requested by applications that provided specific time horizons
suggests planning for longer engagements with communities or increased flexibility to
provide capacity for impact assessments.
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Discussion
An engaged leader encourages strategic change (Bryson, 2004) but is also aware
of how short-term resource seeking may shift long-term strategic planning (Burger &
Owens, 2013). Leaders from the conventional weapons destruction field are actively
managing relationship between stakeholders throughout the sector. Given the difficult
and dangerous contexts in which they operate, it is imperative that CWD operators strike
a balance between safety, compliance, and performance. Leaders at all levels and with
all measures of influence can use participatory or transformational leadership to empower
others (Bass, 1985; George, 2007). By managing across multiple accountability
mechanisms, NGO leaders in the field can activate their organizations’ capacity and
creativity within the framework of monitoring and evaluation.
As noted above, while this study rejected one independent variable from the
model (previous funding), there is clearly a movement in the community of practice
toward developing more rigorous long-term impact assessment procedures. Better
defined monitoring systems can be linked with strategic goals and objectives. While the
focus of conventional weapons destruction has historically been on technical
competencies, there is a demonstrated interplay between capacity development,
organization mission and objectives, and evaluation activities (Zimmerman & Stevens,
2006). Focusing exclusively on practical accountability at the expense of strategic
accountability (Cavill & Sohail, 2007) further endangers organizations that take on
responsibility of seeking external resources (Pfeffer & Salanick, 1978).
In many ways, a donor-led emphasis on accountability that is founded on a more
participatory process is the logical progression for the landmine-action sector. Besides
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being a highly technical field requiring subject expertise on the part of service providers,
it is one in which the implementing partner is the primary public face of these efforts.
NGOs operating in conflict spaces have significantly more leverage than organizations
seeking donor funding for more generic or less public activities. The devolution of
services exposes donor-governments to additional risk—leaders in these institutions must
recognize NGOs as strategic actors with significant expertise and agency (Fogarty, 2011).
A participatory design method of long-term impact assessments recognizes the power
dynamics particular to the field and the pursuit of mutual aims by both donor and
implementing partner leadership. Additionally, the qualitative analysis completed on the
applications has generated a number of rich avenues for research and has the potential to
uncover and generate sector-specific best practices that improve service delivery
globally.
Assessments are important to operations and strategy as well as overall
accountability and legitimacy. The CWD community of practice and the nonprofit sector
would clearly benefit from acquiring additional, quality data—by moving forward in a
participatory, non-coercive manner, the data collected may have further utility to
operations, planning, accountability, and strategy. An overarching goal of CWD projects
is to build indigenous capacity; so, while many accountability mechanisms may be
donor-led, this study recognizes the opportunity to develop organizational capacity at all
levels. In the proposals that included LTIAs, there was a common baseline
understanding to structure and information sources. Information dissemination emerged
as a higher-level integration of these structural elements with the sector-specific
tools/techniques and time horizons.
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Most theorists on the broader aim of impact assessments recognize that “impact,”
for most nonprofits, equates with long-term effects (see Wainwright, 2003). Many
NGOs—even the highly bureaucratic and established ones—pursue theories of change
over influence on policy goals (Fogarty, 2011). I take here Weiss’s definition of theories
of change, which grew from attempts to measure and analyze interventions, as the
individual steps leading to long-term change as well as the framework for pursuing a
project’s objectives and outcomes at each step (see Weiss, 1995). This is especially
relevant to the CWD community of practice, given its function as both an influencer of
international development norms and direct service provider to conflict-affected
countries. Through this view, CWD activities can rebalance the common power
dynamics of the donor/implementer divide and refocus attention on leadership and
strategic planning capacities. There is also an opportunity for donors or experts beyond
the field to review and augment the initial LTIA proposals—thin proposals suggest a
field in transition with leaders who have not yet identified sufficient resources or built
capacities to move forward unilaterally.
Significance of the Study and Limitations. This study was limited in its ability
to customize the competitive process, given the federal regulations governing notices of
funding opportunity. This study was further limited in its ability to test across multiple
donors within this community of practice. The quantitative analysis evaluated the
relationship between the inclusion of LTIAs and requested funding and proposed staff
size, although other factors could be influencing the model. There are limited countries
for operations, implementing partners, operational cycles, and competitive process—
further restrictions on the generalizability of this study and its findings. While this model
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cannot control for the clearinghouse effect at organizations’ headquarters nor control for
country-specific issues, my line of inquiry was mostly unrelated to these issues. This
study had access to applications from a large body of organizations operating in the CWD
sector and provided insights for operations in post-conflict or transitional spaces. The
study is also the first investigation into the giving practices and assessment activities of
the sector’s largest bilateral donor.
Additionally, as has been noted, the dangerous nature of the work (and the
dangerous places where the work is undertaken) provides legitimate concerns about
disrupting standards and best practices. Especially when discussing explosive clearance
and remediation, the donor was focused on compliance with standards first and on
tangential benefits afterward. That said, the qualitative results of this study yielded
interesting results where LTIAs are included in project implementation and improve
service delivery. The sector may benefit as evaluations are designed to be both a
compliance measure and organizational development tool. It is currently difficult for
donor-government to understand how the leaders of CWD programs manage coordination
and decision-making mechanisms. A participatory design may therefore help with fielddriven LTIAs (Daniell, et. al., 2011).
The present study identified two statistically significant organizational
characteristics in modelling the inclusion of long-term impact assessment activities. With
both organizational size (as measured by the proposed project staff) and requested
funding level, there is an underlying theoretical connection to professionalization,
entrenchment, dependency, and accountability. Leaders of organizations that are wellfunded or stably funded can turn their attention to building internal capacity, thinking
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strategically and creatively, and pursuing organizational development objectives.
Increased funding also results in a concomitant increase in scrutiny. As we have seen,
additional accountability can divert attention if leaders have not prepared their
organizations or adopted a strategic vision for using data collected for continual learning
and improvement. The organizational characteristics of funding and staff stand in for
internal capacity—the larger an intervention (as measured by staff size or funding level),
the more resources the organization feels it can or should request. It also suggests an
affinity between the donor-government and the organization, which leaders can leverage,
and an opportunity to observe leader experience and style as well as leadership decision
points. These relationships are ripe for further study.
While this study did not identify previous donor funding as statistically significant
to the model, that in and of itself is revelatory. In most of the theory development and
contemporary discussion of donor leverage and NGO compliance, funding is a key
component. Donors opt to continue funding past recipients while NGOs are at pains to
retain existing funders. At least in the limited situation investigated by this study, it
would appear that previous funding from a donor is not related to CWD operators’
compliance with donor-prompted change. Additional variables related to context and
capacity (such as organization age and scope of operations) may elucidate a more
statistically significant relationship.
It is also important to consider issues with clearly and consistently establishing
evaluation requirements and components (Scott, 1998). That is to say, donorgovernments may need to devote time and resources not only to communicating
requirements to applicants but also to internal professional development on the subject of
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assessment and evaluation. Donor-government leadership may need to take internal steps
to improve understanding of and emphasis on measurement and accountability
mechanisms as part of the competitive application evaluation process. This study may
help the donor-government exercise leadership in this regard, working collaboratively to
align its strategic goals and objectives with an LTIA development process. It is
important to not overstate donor prerogative and stewardship of the CWD sector—
simplistic interpretations of donor-government dominance misunderstand NGO agency
(Bryce, 2006).
NGO leaders can develop clear and documented needs, and ensure change and
innovation are successful (see Gilley, Dixon, & Gilley, 2008). Additionally, they can
cultivate deeper relationships with donors. This could include information dissemination
practices that bring the donor into more frequent or thorough communication with the
implementing partner about the donor’s overall goals and strategic objectives as they
relate to impact at the field level. Additionally, larger funding amounts may mean more
dollars are available to support LTIA activities (see discussion on dedicated teams and
training as part of the qualitative strand). Larger budgets may also indicate specific
carve-outs for LTIA activities. Finally, the quantitative analysis indicates that
organizations both large and small may be devoting more time and resources to
implementing long-term impact assessments. The formal and informal relationships
between donors and NGOs support each other (Batley & Mcloughlin, 2010). All of these
trends may be explored in future studies.
There are also a number of rich findings for the CWD community of practice.
The first is that, of the applications that included LTIA activities, all included multiple
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components to enhance the overall LTIA collection process. Certainly, these elements
were not equally substantial in and of themselves (a framework for LTIAs is a minimal
effort and not all information sources were well-defined); however, the use of
information dissemination suggests a deeper understanding of impact assessment value.
A part of the community of practice has identified more robust monitoring and
evaluation—it is the imperative for NGO leaders to activate capacity (if donors have not
yet provided resources) and creativity (to capitalize on cost-effective measures). Overall,
these trends supplement the findings of the quantitative analysis and suggest an
increasing level of professionalism in the field and an opportunity to enhance overall
monitoring and evaluation of service delivery. Additionally, the inclusion of certain
structures and a focus on interacting with beneficiaries suggests a more careful approach
to evaluation by implementing partners.
Any steps to integrate data collection, analysis, and reporting into operations
represents movement beyond the thin International Mine Action Standards on monitoring
and evaluation (and a sense that monitoring and evaluation distract from priorities like
clearing land of explosive hazards). The LTIA activities proposed included the use of
qualitative and quantitative data as part of an integrated structure for continual learning.
This includes the use of data collected for planning future operations. Several proposals
included full integration of the data collection and analysis into project delivery—starting
with “real and perceived” impact data, the proposals moved to comparing data between
project sites, developing key performance indicators, and promoting continual learning
by implementing a feedback loop to operations in the field. This kind of higher-level
data analysis is common within the private sector and part of best practices; however, its
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use in the technically challenging conventional weapons destruction field has been
limited to-date. It was especially encouraging to see the use of impact assessments to
improve the quality of decision making that will influence future interventions. Further,
the proposal to engage with donors as part of information dissemination links
organizational capacity and initiative with practice aspects of LTIA development—and
substantiates the collaborative approach to reporting and storytelling.
Beyond the structure and focus of the LTIA data collection and analysis, the
CWD community of practice can clearly benefit from some of the tools and time horizons
established in the proposals this study considered. The common recommendation of a
six-month window for post-intervention impact analysis suggests a consensus among
operators that at least preliminary benefits will appear in the field within six months of
project delivery and that they can use this information in reporting. Such a “long term”
assessment window is short by comparison to other fields. It may be sufficient time to
the CWD community—it would be sufficient time to determine land use—but should be
the subject of future research for validation. This initial assessment window may allow
for more proactive intervention design, more realistic budget development, and more
thorough pre- and post-impact data collection. Future work should include analysis and
engagement between implementing partners and donors. If implementing partners see
service delivery benefits within six months, they may be able to advocate for longer
periods of performance with the donor-government (or develop an intervention design
that incorporates a previous project’s post-impact deliverables under the monitoring
regime of a current project). There may also be other limitations on NGO leaders’
attempts to suggest a time period—deployment constraints, security or logistical
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considerations, proposal length restrictions, etc. NGO leaders may also not be prepared
to fully commit resources to an activity that is only, at present, optional. Future iterations
may also allow implementing partners to budget for specific tools needed to conduct the
improved pre- and post-impact assessments.
Regarding the tools and implementation of LTIAs, there was a growing
understanding that dedicated staff (and training for that staff) are necessary within the
community of practice. Leaders need to understand this capacity requirement and should
make sufficient adjustments to strategies, planning, and resources. Several organizations
suggested assessment teams that liaise directly with impacted communities and service
beneficiaries. Identifying specific personnel would remove additional, potentially
onerous, measurement requirements for operational or field staff with other (technically
challenging or safety-related) responsibilities. Although adding staff would require a
concomitant increase in funding needs or the extension of periods of performance, the
focus on data collection from direct beneficiaries responds to increased requirements
from donors for accountability and performance data. It also answers questions about
overall project legitimacy, need, and impact—especially when structured as part of a
process that not only produces data but also disseminates it to key stakeholders as part of
strategic goals and objectives.
Changes for the field. Based on the results of this study, we can offer both practical and
theoretical relevance for leaders and practitioners. Within the CWD community of
practice, the outcomes of this study can help refine the measurement and evaluation
techniques taken by the community at large. Multiple constituencies have competing and
overlapping motivations for measuring services and growth (Campbell & Lambright,
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2016). This study should help refine and revise the International Mine Action Standards
as well as the standard operating procedures for donor-governments. It specifically has
identified opportunities to expand the aperture of the IMAS beyond safety and
compliance to a culture of information sharing, capacity building, and stakeholder
engagement. As a member of the IMAS Review Board, the donor-government could help
initiate a review of the standards for impact assessment and use the IMAS as a venue to
engage implementing partners and stakeholders on these issues. For professional peers,
this study offers an important insight into the real-time relationship between a large donor
and global implementing partners. Additionally, it can help leaders and practitioners in
donor-governments and in grant-seeking organizations understand the capacity
requirements for the development, deployment, and marketing of long-term impact
assessments in the CWD community of practice and international development sphere.
As DePree (2004) wrote, “Leaders can delegate efficiency, but they must deal personally
with effectiveness” (p. 8).
At an organizational level, there is considerable support in the literature for
leaders to enable the talents and abilities of their subordinates (Kouzes & Posner, 2000).
Rafferty and Griffin (2004) reexamined the transformational leadership model
promulgated by Bass (1985) and found support for intellectual stimulation contributing to
employees’ interest in problems and improvement of the solutions they created. There
was a positive relationship between intellectual stimulation and both affective
commitment and continuance commitment to the firm. This suggests that if leaders were
to more positively involve their staff in responding to changes in donor support for LTIA
activities—or donor requirements for assessment and accountability mechanisms more

LEADING FROM THE FIELD

86

broadly—they may positively stimulate employees’ idea generation and increase
employees’ commitment to the organization more broadly. This presents an opportunity
for leaders to engage with the creativity and cost-consciousness of organizations while
supporting organizational development.
Visualizing the CWD community of practice within the broader international
development context highlights the current moment as an inflection point, one at which
leaders in the field can capitalize on momentum to improve impact assessment activities
and build lasting capacity. Performance assessment, when adequately resourced, can
improve management and strategic planning. While international NGOs have shown
initiative in developing practices for impact assessment (Kang, 2012; Rugh, 2004), the
CWD community of practice and the International Mine Action Standards have focused
on more traditional measures of outputs and outcomes. NGOs play a critical role in
disseminating management practices within civil societies, and leaders in CWD
implementing organizations can have an outsized impact in this regard because of their
direct contact with communities with less capacity and in transitional spaces.
One of the more important opportunities for leaders in CWD organizations is to
build on the momentum established by stakeholders calling for increased accountability
through long-term impact assessments. The literature and this study recognize that, while
specific metrics or checklists may not exist to best deploy LTIAs, there is clear support
for accountability regimes that offer multiple benefits—but only if they are deployed
strategically in coordination with stakeholders. Donor-governments are establishing the
policy framework not only to prevent poor performance but also to promote stability
(Batley & Mcgloughlin, 2010) and build capacities. The literature sees NGOs as
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strategic actors in their own right (Fogarty, 2011). The critical component of that agency
will be NGO leaders engaging with donor-governments to substantiate the value of
impact assessments. Practitioners can transform rote compliance into a deeper
relationship where strategic leaders both in NGOs and donor-governments collaborate to
best promote the long-term outcomes of their collective work.
Further research. Leadership is fundamentally tied to accountability, and it is the
responsibility of leaders to create the framework in which they can demonstrate
effectiveness. As this study notes, the development and deployment of long-term impact
assessment has the potential to make the most of access and expertise of NGO leaders
while responding to outside pressure for monitoring and evaluation. To capitalize on this
access, NGO leaders must be aware of power dynamics with donors and be prepared to
advocate for their organizations, expand capacity, plan strategically. Future research
should attempt to continue this line of investigation to see what additional organizational
factors are associated with long-term impact assessment activities within this community
of practice.
As noted above, further research may also wish to focus on internal donor
practices related to educating and training donor-government review panel members on
the priorities and best practices for LTIA activities. It is entirely possible that the
community of practice did not respond to requests for long-term assessment
methodologies at higher rates because the donor did not effectively or consistently
communicate this priority. Although this study could not rewrite large sections of the
donor-government’s competitive announcements, the study’s results may spur the donor
to more actively solicit both proposals for LTIA deployment and relevant variable data
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for further analysis (for example, organization age, the experience of senior personnel,
training plans, and organizations’ global operations).
This study represents one of the few opportunities to engage the CWD community
of practice with scholarly research. To this point, most responses to donor-government
interest in long-term assessments have been passive. Practitioners can use this study to
move the conversation in a more active direction. Organizational capacity is critical for
measurement and evaluations—leaders must create a workable environment, which may
mean actively discussing measurement and evaluation activities with donor-governments.
Future research will also have the opportunity to engage with NGOs’ global headquarters
to better understand broader monitoring and evaluation schemes that support field-level
practice across multiple donor accountability regimes. NGO leaders can strategically use
these conversations to continue internal learning while demonstrating value and overall
impact.
Further research should continue to pursue the analysis of qualitative data
available in successful (and potentially unsuccessful) applications. As we have seen,
operators in the field are not completely intransigent to the development and deployment
of LTIA activities—and incorporating them as part of ongoing service delivery. Leaders
at nongovernmental organizations may be able to encourage or incentivize such activities,
and future research should also continue to pursue that course of investigation.
Activating NGO creativity helps an organization cohere; so practitioners and NGO
leaders can manage internal stakeholders and build capacity while responding to external
requirements. By balancing all of these factors with the need to deliver high-quality
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services, leaders can pursue a participatory model of impact assessment development and
deployment that satisfies donor-governments and builds internal competencies.
This was the first significant review of funding practices by the world’s largest
bilateral donor to CWD as well as an attempt to determine how the CWD community of
practice might incorporate long-term impact assessments in its service delivery. This
study was unique because of the transitional and post-conflict spaces in which CWD
activities take place. Conventional weapons destruction activities are often the predicates
to other stabilization and development activities. Process improvements to these
operations offer a blueprint for leaders to build indigenous capacity as a model for
additional stabilization and development efforts in post-conflict or transitional spaces.

LEADING FROM THE FIELD

90
References

AbouAssi, K. (2012). Hands in the pockets of mercurial donors: NGO response to
shifting donor priorities. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 42(3), 584602.
AbouAssi, K. (2014a). Get money involved? NGO’s reactions to donor funding and their
potential involvement in the public policy process. Voluntas: International
Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 25(4), 968-990.
AbouAssi, K. (2014b). Testing resource dependency as a motivator for NGO selfregulation: Suggestive evidence from the global south. Nonprofit and Voluntary
Sector Quarterly, 44(6), 1255-1273.
Alaimo, S. P. (2008). Nonprofits and evaluation: Managing expectations from the
leader’s perspective. New Directions for Evaluation, 2008(119), 73-92.
Aldrich, T. (2000). Reactivating lapsed donors: A case study. International Journal of
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Marketing, 5(3), 288–293.
Allen, S. L., Smith, J. E. & Da Silva, N. (2013). Leadership style in relation to
organizational change and organizational creativity: Perceptions from nonprofit
organizational members. Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 24(1), 23-42.
Allio, M. K. (2012). Strategic dashboards: designing and deploying them to improve
implementation. Strategy and Leadership, 40(5), 24-31.
Andreoni, J. (1990). Impure altruism and donations to public goods: A theory of warmglow giving. The Economic Journal, 100(401), 464-477.
Andreoni, J. (2007). Charitable giving. In S. N. Durlauf & L. E. Blume (Eds.), The New
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (2nd ed.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

LEADING FROM THE FIELD

91

Anheier, H. K. (2009). What kind of nonprofit sector, what kind of society?: Comparative
policy reflections. American Behavioral Scientist, 52(7), 1082–1094.
Arvidson, M. (2018). Change and tension in non-profit organizations: Beyond the
isomorphism trajectory. VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and
Nonprofit Organizations, 29(5), 898-910.
Atia, M. (2018). Governing through patronage: The rise of NGOs and the fall of civil
society in Palestine and Morocco. VOLUNTAS: International Journal of
Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 29(5), 1044-1054.
Avina, J. (1993). The evolutionary life cycles of non-governmental development
organizations. Public Administration and Development, 13(5), 453-474.
Bachke, M. E., Alfnes, F. & Wik, M. (2014). Eliciting donor preferences. Voluntas,
25(2), 465-486.
Balser, D. & McClusky, J. (2005). Managing stakeholder relationships and nonprofit
organization effectiveness. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 15(3), 295315.
Bass, B. M. (1985). Leadership and performance beyond expectations. Collier
Macmillan.
Batley, R. (2011). Structures and strategies in relationships between non-government
service providers and governments. Public Administration and Development,
31(4), 306-319.
Batley, R. & Mcloughlin, C. (2010). Engagement with non-state service providers in
fragile states: Reconciling state-building and service delivery. Development
Policy Review, 28(2), 131-154.

LEADING FROM THE FIELD

92

Baum, N. (2012). Field supervision in countries ridden by armed conflict. International
Social Work, 55(5), 704-719.
Behn, R. (2004). Performance leadership: 11 better practices that can ratchet up
performance. Washington, D.C.: IBM Center for the Business of Government.
Behn, B. K., DeVries, D. D., & Lin, J. (2010). The determinants of transparency in
nonprofit organizations: An exploratory study. Advances in Accounting, 26(1), 612.
Bell, D. (1982). Regret in decision making under uncertainty. Operations Research,
30(5), 961–981.
Benjamin, L. M. (2008). Account space: How accountability requirements shape
nonprofit practice. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 37(2), 201-223.
Bennett, R. (2009). Regret and satisfaction as determinants of lapsed donor
recommencement decisions. Journal of Nonprofit and Public Sector
Marketing, 21(4), 347-366.
Bloodgood, E. A., Tremblay-Boire, J., & Prakash, A. (2014). National styles of NGO
regulation. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 43(4), 716-736.
Borins, S. (2002). Leadership and innovation in the public sector. Leadership &
Organization Development Journal, 23(8), 467-476.
Brown, L. K. & Troutt, E. (2004). Funding relations between nonprofits and
government: A positive example. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly,
33(1), 5-27.
Bryce, H. J. (2006). Nonprofits as social capital and agents in the public policy process:

LEADING FROM THE FIELD

93

Toward a new paradigm. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 35(2), 311318.
Bryson, J. M. (2011). Strategic planning for public & nonprofit organizations: A guide
to strengthening & sustaining organizational achievement. 4th ed. San
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Burger, R. (2012). Reconsidering the case for enhancing accountability via regulation.
Voluntas, 23(1), 85-108.
Burger, R. & Owens, T. (2013). Receive grants or perish? The survival prospects of
Ugandan non-governmental organizations. The Journal of Development Studies,
49(9), 1284-1298.
Burt, C. D. & Popple, J. S. (1998). Memorial distortions in donation data. The Journal of
Social Psychology, 138(6), 724-733.
Campbell, D. A. & Lambright, K. T. (2016). Program performance and multiple
constituency theory. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 45(1), 150-171.
Carman, J. G. (2007). Evaluation practice among community-based organizations:
Research into the reality. American Journal of Evaluation, 28(1), 60-75.
Carman, J. G. (2011). Understanding evaluation in nonprofit organizations. Public
Performance and Management Review, 34(3), 350-377.
Carman, J. G. & Fredericks, K. A. (2008). Nonprofits and evaluation: Empirical
evidence from the field. New Directions for Evaluation, 119, 51-71.
Carman, J. G. & Fredericks, K. A. (2010). Evaluation capacity and nonprofit
organizations: Is the glass half-empty or half-full? American Journal of
Evaluation, 31(1), 84-104.

LEADING FROM THE FIELD

94

Carnochan, S.; Samples, M.; Myers, M.; Austin, M. J. (2014). Performance measurement
challenges in nonprofit human service organizations. Nonprofit and Voluntary
Sector Quarterly, 43(6), 1014-1032.
Cavill, S. & Sohail, M. (2007). Increasing strategic accountability: A framework for
international NGOs. Development in Practice, 2, 231-248.
Chalhoub, M. S. (2009). The effect of management practices on corporate performance:
An empirical study of non-governmental organizations in the Middle East.
International Journal of Management, 26(1), 51-76.
Clark, J. A. (2006). Field research methods in the Middle East. PS: Political Science and
Politics, 39(3), 417-424.
Cohen, N. & Arieli, T. (2011). Field research in conflict environments: Methodological
challenges and snowball sampling. Journal of Peace Research, 48(4), 423-435.
Connolly, T., Conlon, E. J., & Deutsch, S. J. (1980). Organizational effectiveness: A
multiple-constituency approach. Academy of Management Review, 5(2), 211-218.
Cresswell, J. W. (2014). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods
approaches. (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Daniell, K.; Manez Costa, M.; Ferrand, N.; Kingsborough, A. B.; Coas, P.; & Ribarova, I.
S. (2011). Aiding multi-level decision-making processes for climate change
mitigation and adaptation. Regional Environmental Change, 11, 243-258.
Dart, R. (2004). Being “business-like” in a nonprofit organization: A grounded and
inductive typology. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 33(2), 290-310.
DePree, M. (2004). Leadership Is An Art. New York: Currency.
DiMaggio, P. (2002). Measuring the impact of the nonprofit sector on society is probably

LEADING FROM THE FIELD

95

impossible but possibly useful. In P. Flynn & V. Hodgkinson (Eds.), Measuring
the impact of the nonprofit sector (pp. 249-272). Boston, MA: Springer.
Doornbos, M. (2003). Good governance: The metamorphosis of a policy metaphor.
Journal of International Affairs, 57(1), 3-17.
Eade, D. (2007). Capacity building: Who builds whose capacity? Development in
Practice, 17(4/5), 630-639.
Ebrahim, A. (2002). Information struggles: The role of information in the reproduction of
NGO-funder relationships. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 31(1), 84114.
Ebrahim, A. (2003a). Accountability in practice: Mechanisms for NGOs. World
Development, 31(5), 813-829.
Ebrahim, A. (2003b). Making sense of accountability: Conceptual perspectives for
northern and southern nonprofits. Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 14(2),
191-212.
Ebrahim, A. (2005). Accountability myopia: Losing sight of organization learning.
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 34(1), 56-87.
Ebrahim, A. (2010). The many faces of nonprofit accountability. In D. Renz (Ed.), The
handbook of nonprofit leadership and management (3rd ed., pp. 110-121). San
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Ebrahim, A., & Rangan, V. K. (2010). Performance measurement in the social sector: a
contingency framework. Working paper, Social Enterprise Initiative, Harvard
Business School, Cambridge, MA.
Eckerd, A. (2014). Two approaches to nonprofit financial ratios and the implications for

LEADING FROM THE FIELD

96

managerial incentives. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 44(3), 437456.
Eckerd, A. & Moulton, S. (2011). Heterogeneous roles and heterogeneous practices:
Understanding the adoption and uses of nonprofit performance evaluations.
American Journal of Evaluations, 32(1), 98-117.
Edwards, M. (2008). Have NGOs made a difference? From Manchester to Birmingham
with an elephant in the room. In A. Bebbington, S. Hickey, & D. C. Mitlin (Eds.),
Can NGOs make a difference? The challenge of development alternatives (pp. 3852). London: Zed Books.
Fafchamps, M. & Owens, T. (2009). The determinants of funding to Ugandan
nongovernmental organizations. World Bank Economic Review, 23(2), 295-321.
Feek, W. (2007). Best of practices? Development in Practice, 17(4/5), 653-655.
Feng, S. (2014). Getting lapsed donors back: an empirical investigation of relationship
management in the post-termination stage. Journal of Nonprofit and Public
Sector Marketing, 26(2), 127-141.
Ferguson, J. (1994). The anti-politics machine: “Development” and bureaucratic power in
Lesotho. The Ecologist, 24(5), 176-181.
Fogarty, E. A. (2011). Nothing succeeds like access? NGO strategies toward multilateral
institutions. Journal of Civil Society, 7(2), 207-227.
Fowler, F. J. (2009). Survey research methods. (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Froelich, K. A. (1999). Diversification of revenue strategies: Evolving resource
dependence in nonprofit organizations. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector
Quarterly, 28(3), 246-268.

LEADING FROM THE FIELD

97

Gardner, J. W. (1990). On Leadership. New York: Free Press.
George, B. (2007). Authentic leaders: They form long-term relationships. Leadership
Excellence, 24(7), 4.
Gilley, A., Dixon, P., & Gilley, J. W. (2008). Characteristics of leadership effectiveness:
Implementing change and driving innovation in organizations. Human Resource
Development Quarterly, 19(2), 153-169.
Gronbjerg, K. A. (1991). How nonprofit human service organizations manage their
funding sources: Key findings and policy implications. Nonprofit Management &
Leadership, 2(2), 159-175.
Hall, M. (2014). Evaluation logics in the third sector. Voluntas, 25(2), 307-336.
Herman, R. D. & Renz, D. O. (1997). Multiple constituencies and the social construction
of nonprofit organization effectiveness. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector
Quarterly, 26(2), 185-206.
Herman, R. D. & Renz, D. O. (2008). Advancing nonprofit organizational effectiveness
research and theory: Nine theses. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 18(4),
399-415.
Heyse, L. (2013). Tragic choices in humanitarian aid: A framework of organizational
determinants of NGO decision making. Voluntas, 24(1), 68-92.
Hinton, R. (2004). Enabling inclusive aid: changing power and relationships in
international development. In L. Groves & R. Hinton (Eds.), Inclusive aid:
Changing power and relationships in international development (pp. 210-220).
New York, NY: Routledge.
Hirschman, A. O. (1970). Exit, voice, and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms,

LEADING FROM THE FIELD

98

organizations, and states. Boston, MA: Harvard University Press.
Hodge, M. M., & Piccolo, R. F. (2005). Funding source, board involvement techniques,
and financial vulnerability in nonprofit organizations: A test of resource
dependence. Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 16(2), 171-190.
Hollander, E. P. (1958). Conformity, status, and idiosyncrasy credit. Psychological
Review, 65(2), 117-127.
Hug, N. & Jager, U. (2014). Resource-based accountability: a case study on multiple
accountability relations in an economic development nonprofit. Voluntas, 25(3),
772-796.
Hung, C. & Hager, M. (2019). The impact of revenue diversification on nonprofit
financial health: A meta-analysis. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly,
48(1), 5-27.
Hwang, H., & Powell, W. W. (2009). The rationalization of charity: The influences of
professionalism in the nonprofit sector. Administrative Science Quarterly, 54(2),
268-298.
International Mine Action Standards, United Nations. (Various amendment publication
dates). International Mine Action Standards. Retrieved from
http://www.mineactionstandards.org
International Mine Action Standards, United Nations. (2013). IMAS 14.10: Guide for
the evaluation of mine action interventions. Retrieved from
https://www.mineactionstandards.org/fileadmin/MAS/documents/imasinternational-standards/English/series-14/IMAS-14-10-Ed1-Am2.pdf
Jaskyte, K. (2008). Employee creativity in U.S. and Lithuanian nonprofit organizations.

LEADING FROM THE FIELD

99

Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 18(4), 465-483.
Johnson, R. B., Onwuegbuzie, A. J., & Turner, L. A. (2007). Toward a definition of
mixed methods research. Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 1(2), 112-133.
Jung, T., Kauffman, J., & Harrow, J. (2013). When funders do direct advocacy: An
exploration of the United Kingdom’s Corston Independent Funders’ Coalition.
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 43(1), 36-56.
Kang, J., Anderson, S. G., & Finnegan, D. (2012). The evaluation practices of U.S.
international NGOs. Development in Practice, 22(3), 317-333.
Keck, M. E. & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in
international politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Kharas, H. (2007). Aid and aid agency effectiveness: An issues note. Washington, DC:
Wolfensohn Center for Development, Brookings Institution.
Knutsen, W. L. (2017). Retaining the benefits of government-nonprofit contracting
relationship: Opposites attract or clash? VOLUNTAS: International Journal of
Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 28(4), 1373-1398.
Kouzes, J., & Posner, B. (1990). Leadership Practices Inventory (LPI): A self-assessment
and analysis. San Diego Pfeiffer & Co.
Lacy, S., Watson, B. R., Riffe, D., & Lovejoy, J. (2015). Issues and Best Practices in
Content Analysis. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 92(4), 791–
811.
Landmine Monitor Report. (2016). How much international funding was provided for
mine action in the reporting period and which countries provided funding?
Retrieved from: http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/the-issues/faqs/mine-action-

LEADING FROM THE FIELD

100

funding/how-much-international-funding-was-provided-for-mine-action-in-2012and-which-countries-provided-funding.aspx
Laurett, R. & Ferreira, J. J. (2018). Strategy in nonprofit organizations: A systematic
literature review and agenda for future research. VOLUNTAS: International
Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 29(5), 881-897.
Lee, Y. & Shon, J. (2018). What affects the strategic priority of fundraising? A
longitudinal study of art, culture and humanity organizations’ fundraising
expenses in the USA. VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and
Nonprofit Organizations, 29(5), 951-961
Lee, Z. & Woodliffe, L. (2010). Donor misreporting: Conceptualizing social desirability
bias in giving surveys. Voluntas, 21(4), 569-587.
Liket, K. C. & Maas, K. (2015). Nonprofit organizational effectiveness: Analysis of best
practices. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 44(2), 268-296.
Lipsky, M., & Smith, S. R. (1989). Nonprofit organizations, government, and the welfare
state. Political Science Quarterly, 104(4), 625-648.
Lu, J. (2015). Which nonprofit gets more government funding? Nonprofits’
organizational attributes and their receipts of government funding. Nonprofit
Management & Leadership, 25(3), 297-312.
March, J. G. (1997). Understanding how decisions happen in organizations.
Organizational Decision Making, 10, 9-32.
Marshall, J. H. & Suarez, D. (2013). The flow of management practices: An analysis of
NGO monitoring and evaluation dynamics. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector
Quarterly, 43(6), 1033-1051.

LEADING FROM THE FIELD

101

McCambridge, R. (2004). Underestimating the power of nonprofit governance. Nonprofit
and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 33(2), 346–354.
McClusky, J. E. (2002). Re-thinking nonprofit organization governance: Implications for
management and leadership. International Journal of Public
Administration, 25(4), 539-559.
Miles, M. B. & Huberman, A. M. (1994). Qualitative data analysis: A sourcebook of
new methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Moxham, C. & Boaden, R. (2007). The impact of performance measurement in the
voluntary Sector: Identification of contextual and processual factors.
International Journal of Operations and Production Management, 27(8), 826845.
Patton, M. Q. (1980). Qualitative evaluation methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Pfeffer, J., & Salanick, G. R. (1978). The external control of organizations: A resource
dependence perspective. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
Pope, J. A., Isely, E. S., & Asamoa‐Tutu, F. (2009). Developing a marketing strategy for
nonprofit organizations: An exploratory study. Journal of Nonprofit & Public
Sector Marketing, 21(2), 184-201.
Rafferty, A. E., & Griffin, M. A. (2004). Dimensions of transformational leadership:
Conceptual and empirical extensions. The leadership quarterly, 15(3), 329-354.
Reed, E. & Morariu, J. (2010). State of evaluation 2010: Evaluation practice and
capacity in the nonprofit sector. Innovation Network. Retrieved May 29, 2018
from http://www.innonet.org/client_docs/innonet-state-of-evaluation-2010.pdf
Roche, C. (1999). Impact Assessment for Development Agencies: Learning to Value

LEADING FROM THE FIELD

102

Change (Oxfam Development Guidelines). Oxford, UK: Oxford Publishing.
Romano, D. (2006). Conducting research in the Middle East's conflict zones. PS:
Political Science and Politics, 39(3), 439-441.
Rugh, J. (2004). The CARE International evaluation standards. New Directions for
Evaluation, 104, 79-88.
Schein, E. H. (1996). Culture: The missing concept in organization
studies. Administrative Science Quarterly, 41(2), 229-240.
Scott, J. C. (1998). Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human
condition have failed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Speckbacher, G. (2003). The economics of performance management in nonprofit
organizations. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 13(3), 267-281.
Stern, E.; Stame, N.; Mayne, J.; Forss, K.; Davies, R.; & Befani, B. DFID working paper
38: Broadening the range of designs and method for impact evaluations. DFID,
London, UK (2012) vi + 91 + 24 pp.
Stone, M. M., Bigelow, B., & Crittenden, W. (1999). Research on strategic management
in nonprofit organizations: Synthesis, analysis, and future
directions. Administration & Society, 31(3), 378-423.
Taylor, S. J., Bogdan, R., & DeVault, M. (2015). Introduction to qualitative research
methods: A guidebook and resource. John Wiley & Sons.
Terrell, S. R. (2012). Mixed-methods research methodologies. The qualitative
report, 17(1), 254-280.
Tran, L. (2019). International NGO centralization and leader-perceived
effectiveness. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 0899764019861741.

LEADING FROM THE FIELD

103

Unerman, J., & O'Dwyer, B. (2010). NGO accountability and sustainability issues in the
changing global environment. Public Management Review, 12(4), 475-486.
Valeau, P.; Eynaud, P.; Chatelain-Ponroy, S.; & Sponem, S. (2018). Toward a
reassessment of the role of rank-and-file stakeholders in nonprofit organizations.
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 48(1), 146-172.
Van Wart, M. (2003). Public-sector leadership theory: An assessment. Public
Administration Review, 63(2), 214-228.
Verbruggen, S., Christiaens, J., & Milis, K. (2011). Can resource dependence and
coercive isomorphism explain nonprofit organizations’ compliance with reporting
standards? Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 40(1), 5-32.
Wainwright, S. (2003). Measuring impact: A guide to resources. London, NCVO
Publications.
Weiss, C. H. (1995). Nothing as practical as good theory: Exploring theory-based
evaluation for comprehensive community initiatives for children and families. In
J. P. Connell, A. C. Kubisch, L. B. Schorr, & C. H. Weiss (Eds.), New approaches
to evaluating community initiatives: Concepts, methods, and contexts (p. 65-92),
Washington, DC: Aspen Institute.
Wells, J. V. & Richmond, M. E. (1995). Populations, metapopulations, and species
populations: What are they and who should care? Wildlife Society Bulletin, 23(3),
458-462.
Wolf, T. (1999). Managing a nonprofit organization: Updated Twenty-first Century
edition. Washington, DC: Free Press.
Yip, J., Wong, S., & Ernst, C. (2008). The nexus effect: when leaders span group

LEADING FROM THE FIELD

104

boundaries. Leadership in Action: A Publication of the Center for Creative
Leadership and Jossey‐Bass, 28(4), 13-17.
Zimmerman, J. A. M. & Stevens, B. W. (2006). The use of performance measurement in
South Carolina nonprofits. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 16(3), 315327.

LEADING FROM THE FIELD

105
Appendix A

The following is an example of the structure of the competitive announcements
used by a donor-government for conventional weapons destruction. Extraneous
information has been removed to reduce clutter and better demonstrate the competitive
announcement template.
U.S. Department of State – Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA)
Program Office:
Opportunity Title:
Announcement Type:
Funding Opportunity Number:
Deadline for Applications:

Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement
2014 Survey and Clearance in Western Cambodia
Request for Application (RFA)
14.PMWRA.Cambodia.RFA
Friday, July 18 5:00p.m. EST

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Department of State’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) is
pleased to announce a competitive process for Fiscal Year 2014 funding for survey and
clearance of explosive remnants of war (ERW) in Western Cambodia. The overarching
purpose is to reduce threats to civilians from ERW. U.S.-based and foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are eligible to apply. Pending Fiscal Year 2014
appropriations, the Office anticipates awarding at least one grant not to exceed $1.5
million. Multiple awards will be given pending the availability of funds.
BACKGROUND
The Office allocates foreign assistance based upon its mission statement: “To reduce the
harmful worldwide effects of at-risk, illicitly-proliferated, and indiscriminately-used
conventional weapons of war.”
This solicitation announces the 2014 grant competitive process in which the Office
requests applicants to submit a full Proposal for the above stated project title. Following a
competitive review panel, the successful IP/IPs will be considered for funding.
2014 PM/WRA GRANT COMPETITION OVERVIEW
Pending the appropriation of fiscal year 2014 funds, the Office anticipates awarding
grants for project periods of up to 12 months to organizations that are successful in the
competitive review of their proposals. Project start dates can be no earlier than 1
September 2014. U.S.-based and foreign non-profit and non-governmental organizations
(NGO) are eligible to submit RFA responses. On a limited basis, for-profit organizations
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may also be eligible to submit RFA responses; however, they may not take a profit from
grant-funded activities.
PM/WRA FUNDING PRIORITIES AND PROJECT EXAMPLES
According to PM/WRA’s Strategic Plan 2014-2018, Conventional Weapons Destruction
(CWD) Program is a set of activities that includes HMA, clearance of ERW, SA/LW
destruction (to include at-risk munitions and MANPADS), stockpile and cache reduction,
and PSSM. CWD supports the advancement of peace and security throughout the world
through the Department’s first foreign assistance objective, achieving peace and security,
by reducing the likelihood of illicit trafficking of conventional arms and ammunition that
fuel conflict and by responding to humanitarian disasters involving explosive hazards that
can prove politically or economically destabilizing.
Project Scope
With the understanding that projects are collaborative in nature, projects for this RFA
will fall under the following category:
1. Clearance of ERW includes:
a. Technical and non-technical survey of suspected hazardous areas
b. clearance of Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and landmines
Project activities must be implemented in one or more Western Cambodia provinces. For
the purposes of this RFA, Western Cambodia provinces include the following:
Battambang, Pursat, Banteay Meanchey, Oddar Meanchey, Preah Vihear, and Siem Reap.
APPLICANT/ORGANIZATION CRITERIA
U.S.-based and foreign NGOs, and institutions of higher education are eligible to apply.
Some projects may be accomplished by USG implementers through Interagency
Agreement. For-profit organizations, including small and disadvantaged businesses, may
apply, but such organizations may not take a profit from PM/WRA funded-activities.
Foreign governments are not eligible to apply but governments may be beneficiaries of
funded programs, provided that funding does not pay salaries of government agency
personnel and that such assistance is not restricted by U.S. law or policy.
Organizations should have demonstrated experience administering successful CWD
projects, preferably in the target country and/or region, humanitarian demining, weapons
destruction, survivors’ assistance, and in similarly challenging security environments.
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PROPOSAL SUBMISSIONS
All PROPOSALS will be screened to determine whether they meet the Technical
Requirements listed below. Proposals that do not meet the Technical Requirements will
not be reviewed for funding.
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Technical Requirements: Proposal Applications MUST include a twelve-page
proposal.
1. FULL Proposal and Narrative to include budget breakdown, cost/m2/brief IP
historical background.
2. FULL Detailed Budget in Excel as attached Annex to the Proposal.
3. The SF-424 and SF-424B forms (online through Grantsolutions.gov)
4. Project Hazard list as per Project Title Documentation.
5. Full Organizational Structure
6. Description of how the project meets PM/WRA priorities or the RFA
announcement
7. Project description, including goals and objectives, and duration. (To include
methodology, initial work plan, proposed summer/winter work plans if required).
8. Project description of activities conducted by sub-grantees and/or local partners
(if using a sub-grantee). The total costs should be outlined under the Contracting
in the Detailed Budget. The actual Subaward/Contract budget must be attached to
the application as an attachment. If the subaward operator or budget are unknown
at this time the budgets of the subawards/ subgrantees must be approved by the
Grants Officer before any pass through costs are allowed.
9. Proof of Cambodian Operational and Organizational accreditation certification.
10. Inventory of proposed DOS project equipment and/or loan agreement for DOS
project equipment.
11. Prior year audit submission.
Detailed Budget:
12. Provide a detailed line item budget which breaks-down all proposed costs in U.S.
Dollars. If cost sharing is offered, include a column for the proposed amount of
cost share.
Optional Impact Assessment Component
At their discretion, applicants may choose to address the measurement of their proposed
project’s long-term impacts. This component must go beyond standard reporting metrics
on the project’s immediate outputs and outcomes, and must outline a long-term impact
assessment methodology that demonstrates the extent to which long-term change has
occurred. While the applicant will design the specifics of the impact assessment plan, it
should include the following components:
▪

Impact assessment indicators: The applicant should develop impact
assessment indicators that measure the extent to which the project has
contributed to change in the project community, population, or area.
Successful applications will include a list of long-term impact assessment
indicators on which data will be collected.
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Data collection: The impact assessment plan should include a baseline
assessment phase. Where project activities prevent baseline data collection,
the applicant can outline steps taken to establish baseline information on the
project. The impact assessment plan must include a data collection phase
after the conclusion of the project. Baseline data must be compared to final
data to demonstrate the extent to which change occurred in the project
community, population, or area. Data collected must be in addition to the
standard monitoring and evaluation metrics that are to be collected during
the project’s implementation.

It will be the responsibility of the applicant to determine the appropriate data collection
methods for their impact assessment. Proposals should include drafts of any data
collection instruments to be used. While the results of the impact assessment should be
presented in the award recipient’s final report, all primary data must be maintained by the
award recipient for a minimum of three years.
As long-term impact assessments are additional to standard grant reporting,
PM/WRA may make additional funding available to carry out impact assessments.
Proposal budgets should include an impact assessment line item if applicants
choose to address this additional component. In some cases, long-term impact data
will be collected and submitted after the grant’s period of performance has been
completed. The grantee is allowed to budget associated costs into the grant
accordingly within the impact assessment line item. Submission of the report must
be complete within 18 months after the end of the period of performance. Proposals
that do not address this additional component will not be penalized during the
application review process. Two additional pages will be allowed beyond the
standard proposal page limit for description of the optional impact assessment plan.
THE COMPETITIVE REVIEW PROCESS
This solicitation will enable the Office to identify organizations that are interested in and
capable of implementing CWD projects in Cambodia.
RFA submissions first will be screened to determine whether they meet the technical
requirements stated in this announcement. Applicants must pay attention to and should
abide by the specified technical requirements. Submissions that do not meet the technical
review requirements will not be read or considered for funding.
Those Submissions that pass the technical review will be reviewed and rated by a panel
comprised of individuals with knowledge and experience in CWD programming and
regional expertise. The assessment will be based on how well the proposed project meets
the priorities outlined in this announcement and addresses the content outlined in the
Format and Content section above. Panel results will consider bilateral, regional, and
global factors, as well as any policies, restrictions, or limitations on U.S assistance that
may apply to each country or region involved. Final approval and Congressional
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Notification must take place before each grant, cooperative agreement, or Interagency
Agreement is awarded.
DEADLINE AND SUBMISSION INSTRUCTIONS
All RFAs must be submitted via www.grantsolutions.gov OR www.grants.gov by 5:00
p.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST) on Friday, July 18 at 5:00. PM/WRA will not
accept proposals submitted via email, fax, the postal system, or delivery companies or
couriers. Applicants may submit more than one application; however, each application
should be submitted only once.
Applicants are strongly encouraged to initiate electronic applications early in the
application development process, and to submit early on the due date or before. This will
aid in addressing any problems with submissions prior to the application deadline. No
exceptions will be made for organizations that have not completed the necessary steps to
submit applications on www.grantsolutions.gov or www.grants.gov.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
This call for Statements of Interest will appear on www.grantsolutions.gov and
www.grants.gov.
Anticipated Time to Award: The Office will work to execute grant awards to
successful applicants pending Congressional authorization of funds in Fiscal Year 2014.
Reporting and Monitoring Requirements: Applicants selected for an award must meet
the following reporting and policy requirements:
1. Reporting Requirements: Grantees are required to submit semi-annual program
progress reports and quarterly financial reports throughout the project period and
final reports 90 days after the close of the project period. Access to funds may be
suspended if reports are late or incomplete.
2. Grant Monitoring: The Office places emphasis on monitoring and evaluation of
all funded projects. Grantees should expect to have their programs visited and
reviewed by a grants and/or programs officer. On-site reviews include assessment
of program and administrative effectiveness.
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Appendix B

The following is the language on optional long-term impact assessment measures
included in some of the notices of funding availability (competitive announcements)
released by the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) in the U.S.
Department of State.
Optional Impact Assessment Component
At their discretion, applicants may choose to address the measurement of their proposed
project’s long-term impacts. This component must go beyond standard reporting metrics
on the project’s immediate outputs and outcomes, and must outline a long-term impact
assessment methodology that demonstrates the extent to which long-term change has
occurred. While the applicant will design the specifics of the impact assessment plan, it
should include the following components:
▪

Impact assessment indicators: The applicant should develop impact
assessment indicators that measure the extent to which the project has
contributed to change in the project community, population, or area.
Successful applications will include a list of long-term impact assessment
indicators on which data will be collected.

▪

Data collection: The impact assessment plan should include a baseline
assessment phase. Where project activities prevent baseline data collection,
the applicant can outline steps taken to establish baseline information on the
project. The impact assessment plan must include a data collection phase
after the conclusion of the project. Baseline data must be compared to final
data to demonstrate the extent to which change occurred in the project
community, population, or area. Data collected must be in addition to the
standard monitoring and evaluation metrics that are to be collected during
the project’s implementation.

It will be the responsibility of the applicant to determine the appropriate data collection
methods for their impact assessment. Applications should include drafts of any data
collection instruments to be used. While the results of the impact assessment should be
presented in the award recipient’s final report, all primary data must be maintained by the
award recipient for a minimum of three years.
As long-term impact assessments are additional to standard grant reporting,
PM/WRA may make additional funding available to carry out impact assessments.
Proposal budgets should include an impact assessment line item if applicants
choose to address this additional component. In some cases, long-term impact data
will be collected and submitted after the grant’s period of performance has been
completed. The grantee is allowed to budget associated costs into the grant
accordingly within the impact assessment line item. Submission of the report must
be complete within 18 months after the end of the period of performance.
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Applications that do not address this additional component will not be penalized
during the application review process. Two additional pages will be allowed
beyond the standard proposal page limit for description of the optional impact
assessment plan.
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